


Norwegian Emigration To Canada 1850-1874

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Dedicated To The Memory Of My Grandmother
Martha Jacobsdatter Johnson
1865-1964

Whitewater, Wisconsin 2010
(revised)

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INTRODUCTION

In the first volume of his study of Norwegian immigration to America, Theodore Blegen noted that while the population of foreign-born Scandinavians increased between 1850 to 1860 by 54,507, the number of Scandinavian immigrants recorded for the same period was only 24,680. And indeed, for the following decade, 1861 to 1870, the difference between the change in the population of Scandinavians and the number of Scandinavian immigrants was even greater: 42,711. Blegen noted that one explanation for the discrepancies between the census and immigration figures for these years was that beginning in 1850, many Scandinavian emigrants landed at Quebec and other Canadian ports, and came to the U.S. via the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes, the ports of entry on this route being largely excluded from the compilation of U.S. immigration statistics. This was particularly true for the Norwegians, who took advantage of the cheap fares to Canada made possible by the trade carried on by Norwegian sailing ships between ports in Canada, Great Britain, and Norway.¹

Beginning with the arrival of 53 people on the sloop Restauration in 1825, and continuing through 1849, all but a few of the Norwegian emigrants to the United States landed at New York. But the arrival of the first Norwegian emigrants in Quebec in 1850 signaled the beginning of a shift in the stream of Norwegian migration from New York to that St. Lawrence River port. The shift was relatively rapid, changing from 3,300 Norwegian arrivals in New York and none in Quebec in 1849, to 377 Norwegian arrivals in New York and 5,123 in Quebec in 1853. From 1850 to 1861, the emigrants came directly by sailing vessel from ports in Norway, and occasionally on ships from Goteborg, Sweden; Liverpool, England; Glasgow, Scotland; and other continental ports. Beginning in 1862, however, Norwegians traveled regularly and in increasing numbers by steamship from Liverpool, and the arrival in 1874 of 506 emigrants on two sailing vessels from Norway marked the end of the direct movement of Norwegians from their home country to Canada. From 1875 until direct steamship connections between the Scandinavian countries and North American ports were established later in the century, most Norwegians traveling to ports in Canada and the United States came via the Hull-Liverpool transit route through Great Britain.

The first and principal theme of the present study is Norwegian emigration to and settlement in Canada during the years 1850 to 1874, placed in the context of the Canadian emigration policy which made it possible. The beginning year of this period is marked, as already noted, by the first Norwegian emigration to Canada, and its final year by the cessation of emigration by sailing ship directly from Norway. A secondary but closely related theme is the ocean transportation of the emigrants and their protection during the voyage. These are areas which concern Norwegian emigration during any period, of course, but their discussion in the context of the emigration to Canada during the third quarter of the century is particularly appropriate—indeed, one might say inescapable—because it was during this period and in connection with the emigration to Canada that major changes occurred in these areas: the change in the mode of transportation from sailing ship to steamship; the change in the route of


emigration from direct to the Hull-Liverpool transit route; and the enactment of emigrant protection laws by the British, American, and Norwegian governments.

During the quarter-century encompassed by this study, very few of the Norwegian emigrants settled in Canada; practically all of them simply used the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes route to reach destinations in the mid-western United States. In the last quarter of the century, as the great western Canadian prairie lands became accessible, a more complex pattern developed. While there was a continuation of the flow through Canada into the United States, there developed a "re-migration" of Scandinavian-Americans from the midwestern States into Canada as the decreasing availability of cheap, fertile land in the former was matched by its increasing availability in the latter. These processes of emigration, re-migration, and settlement continued well into the present century. The present study, encompassing as it does only the first 25 years of a long process during which the migration and settlement patterns were relatively simple, can only be a modest contribution to what is an enormous and complex field of historical study.

This study is based on the annual reports of the emigration agents at Quebec and other Canadian ports, and on other Canadian government documents; on government documents from Norway and the United States; on personal accounts by emigrants; and on secondary sources. Since the annual emigration reports from Quebec are important sources throughout the study, some additional comments regarding their content are in order.² Included in these reports are summary information on the emigrants arriving at Quebec; reports on particular emigrant groups and special subjects; reports from agents in the emigration offices at other ports; reports from agents in Great Britain and on the continent; and tables of statistical series. The statistical series include a main table in which each year's passengers are classified by country from "whence" they came, and then cross-tabulated by cabin and steerage classes; and for the steerage class (only) by sex and age, births and deaths in passage, and deaths in quarantine. Also included in the main table is the total number of vessels arriving from each country, the total tonnage of these vessels, the total number of seamen aboard them (1850-1861), whether they were "steamers" or "sailing vessels" (1856-1875), and the average days "in passage." A second important table indicates the ports of departure of emigrants by countries, and a third lists the "trades and callings" or occupations of the emigrants, but without regard to sex or country.³

While no critical studies of Canadian migration statistics could be found, these statistics probably suffer from some of the same defects—inaccuracy, incompleteness, vagueness of and changes in categories—which are found in other early collections of emigration and immigration statistics from the United States and other nations.⁴ But they are the only statistics available, and they do provide not only a record of the important Norwegian migration to and through Canada, but a cross-section view of the Norwegian emigrant stream during a critical quarter-century period in the development of Norwegian migration which is unavailable from the U.S. statistics. This is so because the Canadian statistics include data on the sex and age of Norwegian emigrants which are not available from U.S. statistics for this period; and about ports of departure, ships, and births and deaths during passage which are not available in the U.S. statistics for any period.

Sketches Of The Quebec Emigrant Receiving Station




GENERAL VIEW OF THE SHEDS.

Quebec Emigrant Receiving Station
General View Of The Sheds Where Emigrants Were Housed And Processed
After Release From The Quarantine Station On Grosse Isle
National Library Of Canada, C59240



A View Of The Quarantine Station At Grosse Isle, Quebec
Henri Delattre, National Archives Of Canada, C120285




Cholera Hospital And Telegraph, Grosse Isle Quarantine Station, Quebec
Ralph Alderson, National Archives Of Canada, C005199




Grosse Isle From The Officer's Quarters
Henry Hugh Manvers Percy, National Archives Of Canada, CO13656



Women's Bedroom Quebec Emigrant Sheds
National Library Of Canada, C59243



Men's Washroom Quebec Emigrant Sheds
National Archives Of Canada, CO59242



Dining Room, Quebec Emigrant Sheds
National Library Of Canada, C59241

THE BEGINNING OF NORWEGIAN EMIGRATION TO CANADA

The abrupt shift of the Norwegian emigrant stream from New York to Quebec during 1850 to 1853 was due to three key factors, one of which discouraged the emigrants from landing in New York and two of which attracted them to Quebec. The first factor was the substantial increase in the fares from Europe to New York toward the end of the 1840's due to laws enacted by the United States and the State of New York.⁵ Laws regulating passenger ships which were enacted by Congress in 1847, 1848, and 1849 imposed new and strict requirements for passenger space, food and water, cooking and toilet facilities, and ventilation and sanitation on all passenger vessels arriving in the United States. Additionally, in May, 1847, New York State approved a law providing for a capitation tax of \$1.00 per emigrant, and a bonding requirement of \$300.00 per emigrant on the vessel owner. The purpose of the bonding requirement was to encourage ship owners and masters to transport only healthy and vigorous passengers and to care for them during the voyage, and to pay for the expense of caring for sick and indigent passengers. The bond could be commuted by a payment of a fee of \$1.00 per passenger, raised in July, 1851 to \$1.50, and in April, 1853 to \$2.50 per passenger.

The high fares which discouraged emigrants from traveling to New York was complemented by two factors which attracted them to Quebec. The first of these was the availability of passenger space and low fares on ships going to Canada from Norway to pick up cargoes of timber. The Canadian timber trade originated with the continental blockade of 1806, which cut Great Britain off from the Baltic and Scandinavian sources of the timber needed to construct the ships of her navy. The British government turned to Canada for supplies of timber, and through generous contracts to timber cutters and heavy duties on imported timber, encouraged the development of a timber industry in New Brunswick and Quebec. The center for this timber trade was the port of Quebec. In the 1840's, there was a substantial increase in the demand for timber in Ireland, where it was needed for the construction of peasant cottages to shelter its burgeoning population and for the manufacture of barrels and crates in which to ship agricultural products.

Since Canada did not provide a large market for finished goods, the ships carrying timber from Canada to the United Kingdom often had to return westward in ballast, or carry cargo to the United States before returning to Canada for timber. The transportation of emigrants from Great Britain, and particularly from Ireland, westward to Canada proved to be the perfect complement to this eastward timber trade. Indeed, the two trades grew together, supporting and strengthening each other. The merchants and ship owners benefited because they now had a paying cargo westward, while the emigrants benefited from the availability of passenger space and cheap fares on returning timber ships.

With the repeal of the English Navigation Acts in 1849, Norwegian vessels became active in the Canadian timber trade, and eventually came to play an important if not dominant role in the trade.⁶ The ships departed Norway for Canada in the spring with emigrants (and possibly cargoes of Norwegian iron), returned eastward to Great Britain with timber, and then went back to Norway to pick up emigrants for another trip westward to Canada.⁷ Since it took a sailing vessel from four to six weeks to cross the north Atlantic, it was usually possible to make only two trips during the shipping season, which began in late April or early May, and ended in late October or early November, depending on ice and weather conditions. There were, of course, variations in this pattern. Timber cargoes were carried to continental ports as well as to Great Britain; vessels returned directly to Canada with emigrants from Great Britain; they might pick up cargoes of timber in Baltic ports for delivery to Great Britain; or they might winter in Canada so that their first trip of the season was eastward with timber. But for the Norwegian emigrants, the important pattern was the triangular trade between Norway, Canada and Great

Britain, and the passenger space and low fares which it made available to them. The second factor which attracted the Norwegian emigrants to Canada was that it was cheaper and faster to travel from Quebec to the great settlements of their countrymen in the midwestern States by the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes route than by any of the routes from east coast ports in the United States. By 1850 there existed a network of steamer and rail routes which carried the emigrants westward, and in subsequent years this network was further developed by extensive railroad construction on the Canadian and American sides. Of these three factors, the availability of cheap passenger space on the timber ships was the most important. The alternatives available to the emigrants were to charter vessels or to take passage on the few vessels which carried cargo (iron) to the United States, or go to ports in Sweden, Germany, France, and Great Britain to find vessels going to America, all too expensive for the vast majority of emigrants.

According to the 1850 emigration report, the first Norwegians arrived in Quebec in the late summer of that year on two sailing ships from Drammen, Lyna and Benedicte.⁸ The report went on to state that the 227 Norwegians were "chiefly farmers" and "all proceeded to the Norwegian settlement in Wisconsin." They obtained passage from Quebec to Chicago for 25 shillings for each adult, luggage included, which, because of the competition among the forwarding companies, was 10 shillings less than the usual fare. Their route would have taken them by steamer to Lewiston on the lower Niagara river, then by train to Buffalo, and then to Chicago.⁹ One-half of the emigrant head tax was also refunded under the provisions of a recently enacted law allowing such refunds to emigrants who certified their intention to continue directly on to the United States.¹⁰

The departures of the Lyna for Quebec (via Falmouth, England) with 157 emigrants on June 18th, and of the Benedicte for "Amerika" with "60-70" emigrants on July 13th were reported by Drammens Adresse.¹¹ Drammens Tidende reported only the departure of the Lyna, stating:¹²

It is possible that the journey will end in Quebec in Canada, probably on account of the return freight, although as far as we can see, this landing place must be less convenient for the passengers destined for the Norwegian colonies in the interior.

Adresse's reply to Tidende's disapproving tone regarding the route through Canada nicely summarizes both the relationship between the timber trade and emigrant transport for Norwegian ships, and the reasons for the shift of trade from the New York to the Quebec route. Adresse stated that according to an agent in Quebec,¹³

passengers could travel daily with steamship from Quebec to Buffalo. The traveling time is only 2-1/2 to 3 days while the traveling time from New York to Buffalo is 5 to 6 days. And, worthy of special notice, there are a lot of empty boats back to the west from Quebec, bringing passengers for any price. It is well known that many emigrants from England have taken the route over Canada to Wisconsin. It has only been on account of the old English Navigation Act that the same route to the North American western republics could not be used from Norway. It would not have been profitable for any Norwegian ship to go to Canada, as long as it was not allowed to bring return freight back. This obstacle does not exist any longer, as we well know, since a more liberal system for foreigners had taken effect since last year in the English shipping laws. In the future, it will probably frequently happen that the emigrant ships will set their course toward Quebec rather than to New York.

Time proved Adresse correct, for the 227 passengers who arrived on Lyna and Benedicte were the vanguard of a stream of emigrants directly from Norway which through 1874 included 115,695 persons,

plus many more who departed from ports in other countries, while only about 35,000 Norwegians are recorded as landing at New York during the same period.

STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF NORWEGIAN EMIGRATION TO CANADA

Arrivals at Quebec

The following tables present a statistical overview of Norwegian emigration through Quebec for the period 1850 to 1874 as recorded in the annual emigration reports. Table 1 shows the aggregate numbers of Norwegians and other Scandinavians who arrived annually in Quebec by country of departure for the period 1850 to 1874. Of the 168,410 Scandinavians who are reported to have landed, 114,852, or 68.2 percent, came directly from Norway, and it is reasonable to assume that they were all Norwegians. To these Norwegians arriving directly from Norway must be added 41 in 1859, and 261 in 1861, who were identified as coming from Sweden; 67 and 199 who were identified as coming from ports in Great Britain in 1853 and 1854 respectively; and those arriving from unidentified ports: 225 in 1854, 2 in 1855, 28 in 1860, and 1 in 1861. The total number of identified Norwegians landing in Quebec during the 25 year period from 1850 to 1874 was therefore 115,695. The 2,750 passengers from Sweden may have included more Norwegians than those identified for 1859 and 1861, since "Gothenburg" (modern Goteborg) was an alternate port of departure for Norwegians. Similarly, the 163 Scandinavians arriving from Germany may have included Norwegians, for Bremen and Hamburg were occasionally used as departure ports.

The figure of 50,251 Scandinavians from ports in Great Britain requires a special explanation. In 1862, Norwegians began arriving at Quebec on steamers from British ports, having trans-shipped through Great Britain from Hull to Liverpool. This route became increasingly popular and by 1875 entirely replaced direct transport from Norway. Unfortunately, the Norwegians arriving by this route were classified in the Quebec emigration reports along with Swedes and Danes as "Scandinavians," and it is therefore not possible to determine directly the number of Norwegians who came to Quebec from ports in England (except for 1853 and 1854, as noted above). There is reason to assume that many if not most of them were Norwegians, however.

Sex and Age of Emigrants

Table 2 shows the age and sex of Norwegian emigrants arriving at Quebec for the years 1853 to 1874 (except for 1854 and 1867 for which reports are not available). It will be noted that for some years, the "total arrived" figures in this table do not agree with the total figures for arrivals from Norway in Table 1. In a few of these years, the differences are accounted for by the inclusion of Swedish immigrants, while for other years there is no obvious reason for the discrepancies. Despite this imprecision and the lack of age categories for the adults, these data are valuable because they help fill a gap in Norwegian immigration statistics, since the United States did not begin to record the sex of immigrants by nationality until 1869, and their age by nationality until 1873. What is particularly notable about these figures is the high and relatively stable proportion of women to men among the adults, on the one hand, and of children to adults, on the other. Taken together, these two characteristics of the data clearly suggest, as does evidence from other sources, that the emigrants consisted primarily of family groups.

Table 1

Arrivals of Scandinavians at Quebec
by Country of Departure, 1850-1874

Year Scandinavians	Norway	Sweden	Germany	Great Britain	No Port Given	Total
1850	244	11				255
1851	225					225
1852	2,197					2,197
1853	5,056			163		5,219
1854	5,586	263		840	225	6,914
1855	1,267				29	1,296
1856	2,806					2,806
1857	6,123	284				6,407
1858	2,389	267				2,656
1859	1,715	41				1,756
1860	1,781				28	1,809
1861	8,406	261			55	8,722
1862	4,949	267		73		5,289
1863	987	126	39	264		1,416
1864	3,999	1,215	48	713		5,975
1865	3,365	15	76	925	1	4,382
1866	13,506			1,462		14,968
1867	11,620			1,553		13,173
1868	9,403			6,628		16,031
1869	8,553			11,576		20,129
1870	8,985			7,795		16,780
1871	5,386			6,614	<u>Via U.S.</u>	12,000
1872	3,788			6,358	2	10,148
1873	2,010			4,397	40	6,447
1874	506			890	14	1,410
Total	114,852 68.2%	2,750 1.6%	163 0.1%	50,251 29.8%	394 0.2%	168,410 100.0%

Table 2
Age and Sex of Norwegian Immigrants
Arriving at Quebec 1853-1874

Year	Adults > 14 Years						Children to 14 Years		
	Males	% of Adults	Females	% of Adults	Total Adults	% of Total	Number	% of Total	Total Arrived
1853	1,929	56.2	1,504	43.8	3,433	68.0	1,618	32.0	5,051
1854	no report								
1855	459	53.7	396	46.3	855	67.5	412	32.5	1,267
1856	1,053	56.0	829	44.1	1,882	67.1	922	32.9	2,804
1857	2,331	55.3	1,887	44.7	4,218	65.8	2,189	34.2	6,407
1858	1,036	55.0	846	45.0	1,882	70.9	774	29.1	2,656
1859	628	55.4	506	44.6	1,134	66.7	565	33.3	1,699
1860	627	55.6	501	44.4	1,128	64.8	613	35.2	1,741
1861	2,869	52.8	2,566	47.2	5,435	63.1	3,185	36.9	8,620
1862	1,806	54.1	1,535	45.9	3,341	64.4	1,891	35.6	5,190
1863	416	55.2	337	44.8	753	67.7	359	32.3	1,112
1864	1,980	56.3	1,536	43.7	3,518	68.1	1,646	31.9	5,162
1865	1,183	55.1	965	44.9	2,148	63.6	1,232	36.4	3,380
1866	5,119	57.5	3,781	42.5	8,900	65.9	4,606	34.1	13,506
1867	no report								
1868	3,485	56.3	2,701	43.7	6,186	65.8	3,217	34.2	9,403
1869	3,174	57.7	2,328	42.3	5,502	64.4	3,036	35.6	8,541
1870	3,016	52.2	2,760	47.8	5,776	64.3	3,209	35.7	8,985
1871	1,843	52.5	1,667	47.5	3,510	65.2	1,876	34.8	5,386
1872	1,238	52.3	1,131	47.7	2,369	64.0	1,332	36.0	3,701
1873	659	51.1	631	48.9	1,290	64.2	720	35.8	2,010
1874	165	51.2	157	48.8	322	63.6	184	36.4	506

Ports of Departure

The 114,383 Norwegian emigrants who arrived at Quebec from 1852 through 1874 were recorded in the annual emigration reports as departing from 30 ports in Norway.^{13A} Christiania with 31.6 percent of the total departures, and Bergen with 25.8 percent, were the chief ports of emigration. These two ports and five others—Stavanger with 9.5 percent, Drammen with 8.5 percent, Porsgrunn with 8.1 percent, Trondheim with 4.8 percent, and Skien with 2.7 percent—accounted for 91.0 percent of the departures during this period, while the remaining departures were made from 23 other ports up and down the coast of Norway. While Christiania and Bergen made the largest overall contributions to the emigrant movement over the 23 year period, their annual proportion of total departures varied considerably. In the case of Christiania, highs ranged from 45.6 percent in 1852, 45.9 percent in 1867, and 53.0 percent in 1874, and lows from 12.4 percent in 1856, 13.9 percent in 1860, and 14.8 percent in 1864, while for Bergen the highs were 42.5 percent in 1856 and 55.4 percent in 1864, and the lows were 18.1 percent in 1855 and 19.8 percent in 1867. Although emigrants were recorded as departing from Christiania each of the 23 years from 1852 to 1874, for the other six major ports (and the 23 other ports as well) there were years in which no emigrant departures were recorded.

It is difficult to assign reasons for these year-to-year and period-to-period fluctuations in the emigrant departures from individual ports, but among the important factors were changes in the pattern of emigration from parishes and districts; the availability of ships; the departure of large organized emigrant groups; and differences in passenger fares. Also, these statistics do not accurately reflect the distribution of emigrant departures among ports after 1865, when large numbers trans-shipped through Great Britain and therefore had no ports of departure in Norway recorded for them. Most of the departures on the trans-shipment route were made from the major ports of Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, and Christiania, however.

NORWEGIAN EMIGRATION AND CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY

Norwegian emigration to Canada from 1850 to 1874 can be understood only in the context of Canadian immigration policies which actively facilitated the entry of Scandinavian, German, and other "foreign"—non-British—emigrants. The significance of this policy for Norwegian emigration can be highlighted by considering what the consequence would have been of a policy which forbade the entry of all emigrants who intended only to pass through Canada on their way to the United States.¹⁴ While it can only be a matter of speculation since such a policy was never pursued, it would seem reasonable to conclude that thousands of Norwegians who were able to come to the United States via the cheaper route to and through Canada would never have left Norway.

The following section provides an overview of Canadian emigration as a background for a detailed discussion of Canadian policy toward Norwegians. The principal source of emigrants into Canada during the first 80 years of the 19th century was the United Kingdom.¹⁵ A few emigrants from "other countries" arrived each year, and after 1846 Germans and then Norwegians arrived in varying but significant numbers from year to year. But in only a few of the years during this period did the numbers arriving from these other countries approach the total from England, Ireland, and Scotland. The principal contributions were made by England and Ireland, the balance between them varying from year to year. The low point (after 1816) was 1836, when 3,266 immigrants were recorded, while the high point (1847 excepted, as noted below) was 1854, when 53,180 arrived.¹⁶

Up to 1850, practically every year was a crisis year, since the number of emigrants, their poverty, and their poor physical condition after the long ocean voyage in sailing vessels severely taxed the immigrant receiving facilities at Quebec. The years 1831-32 and 1842-48 were particularly bad. Over 50,000 arrived each of the former two years, bringing with them the cholera which was raging in England, and uncounted numbers died during the voyage and many hundreds after arrival at Quebec. During the latter period there were poor economic conditions in Great Britain and North America, and repeated visitations of disease and famine in Ireland. The worst year was 1847, when 74,408 arrived, 73 percent of them emigrants from Ireland fleeing the potato famine and typhus raging in that then wretched land.¹⁷ The sick and destitute among the emigrants were at first cared for by Roman Catholic organizations, but beginning in 1823 the government of Lower Canada also provided annual grants for immigrant relief. In 1830, an immigrant hospital was established at Point Levi, opposite Quebec, and in 1832, in an unsuccessful effort to protect the city against a cholera epidemic in England, a quarantine hospital was established on Grosse Isle, an island in the St. Lawrence 33 miles below Quebec. In 1832 Lower Canada established an immigrant head tax to finance passages to Upper Canada for the indigent and to support the private immigration societies and the immigrant hospitals. All emigrants paid the tax, and all were equally entitled to disbursements from the fund, even if they were going on to the United States.

In an effort to correct some of the terrifying conditions and evil practices to which emigrants were routinely subjected on board the sailing vessels which carried them to British North America, Parliament enacted a series of so-called passenger acts, beginning in 1803.¹⁸ While these acts differed in scope and effectiveness, in general they were intended to regulate the number of passengers which could be carried according to the size of a vessel (passenger density); and to establish minimum levels of stocks of food and water, and standards of sanitation. To enforce these acts on vessels arriving from ports in Great Britain, the Imperial Government established in 1828 an emigration office at Quebec, then the major port of emigrant debarkation.¹⁹ In 1832 emigration offices for Upper Canada were established at Montreal and Toronto. The disbursement of relief funds was also taken from the private immigration societies and placed in the hands of the Quebec agent. The first emigration agent at Quebec, A.C. Buchanan, served until 1838, and was succeeded by his nephew of the same name. With no formal instructions and far beyond the pale of effective supervision by the Imperial government, the Buchanans worked tirelessly to enforce and improve the passenger acts, to provide advice and support to the immigrants, and to relieve the suffering of the destitute and sick among them. The passenger acts, inadequate as they were, and the work of the Buchanans, did much to ameliorate the lot of the immigrants.

Emigration from the United Kingdom to Canada was unrestricted by law and unregulated by policy. At the level of principle, there was strong support for emigration to Canada among enlightened individuals in the Union and Imperial governments and among the general public, for they recognized that a sparsely populated territory of such vast extent and rich resource could only be civilized and developed by large numbers of immigrants. Plans for systematic colonization were proposed under which Canada through planned immigration and settlement would be developed as a source of raw materials for the mother country and a market for its products. At the practical level, the situation was not so clear-cut. Economic conditions in Canada and Great Britain, the cross-purposes of policy-makers and policies, public opinion, and a host of other factors—not the least of which was the greed and indifference which lead to fraud, corruption, and malfeasance on both sides—obstructed the development and implementation of rational policies for emigration and immigration. The key operative factor on the side of the mother country was the pressure to be rid of surplus population and a great army of unemployed. On the Canadian side, the key factor was capacity to absorb the great mass of people received yearly from England, Ireland, and Scotland. What Canada needed were young, healthy

individuals who possessed the minimum skills and means to succeed as pioneers in a vast and untamed wilderness. What Canada received was a mixture of young and old, healthy and sick, skilled and unskilled, most of them desperately poor. It was impossible as a practical matter for a small, developing, agricultural society to absorb more than a few of these people at a time.

While the total number of emigrants arriving in Canada was in many years in excess of the capacity of the country to absorb them, the government undertook measures to encourage the more desirable people to emigrate to and remain in Canada. These measures to "woo" the emigrants included cheap or free land; assisted passages; ethnic and religious settlements; and advertising.²⁰ Of these, great emphasis was placed on advertising and dissemination of information. Indeed, it became a fixed conviction of the government that ignorance about Canada was "the circumstance which primarily controls Emigration to this province."²¹ Since Canada was obviously such a wealthy and well-governed land, so the reasoning ran, prospective emigrants need only be provided with sufficient information through maps, brochures, exhibitions, agents, and lectures, and they would make the one correct decision: to settle in Canada. As early as 1840, an emigration agent was sent to England to disseminate information about Canada, and small annual appropriations for the promotion of emigration were made beginning in 1854. During the first few years this money was used primarily for the printing and distribution of advertising materials through existing public and private agencies in Great Britain and on the continent. Pamphlets which provided information about the weather, resources, crops, agricultural practices, and so on, were widely distributed. One of these, entitled Canada: A Brief Outline of Her Geographical Position, Productions, Climate, Capabilities, Educational and Municipal Institutions, prepared in 1856 and translated into French, German, and Norwegian, was distributed in large numbers in England and on the continent for over a decade. Later, as a first step in what was to develop into a major campaign to obtain emigrants, agents were sent to the United Kingdom and the continent to promote aggressively the advantages of Canada.

The Canadian immigration authorities lamented the effective work of the numerous emigration agents representing American ship, rail and land companies, and the individual states in Europe.²² To counter what they characterized as the misrepresentation of conditions in the United States by these agents, they placed even greater emphasis on the dissemination of information about the advantages of Canada. But no amount of information about Canada could overcome the real advantages enjoyed by the United States in the competition for desirable emigrants. Vast, well-governed, and potentially rich Canada may have been, but in almost every respect the United States was superior to or at least ahead of Canada.²³ One of the key factors working against Canada was the easy availability of tillable land in the American midwest. Much of the land in Canada was heavily forested and inaccessible, and most newly arrived immigrants had neither the practical experience nor the stamina to establish homesteads under these conditions. The land was also poorly surveyed, much of it was held in reserve for speculation, and the conveyance procedures were cumbersome.²⁴ In contrast, in the American midwest millions of acres of prime agricultural land which needed no clearing but only the breaking plow, were available on easy terms from conveniently located offices of the railroad and land companies, and the federal government.

Canada's disadvantaged position was compounded by the activities of the ship and rail forwarding and ticket agents, in whose interest it was to send emigrants as far west into the United States as possible. This practice became particularly effective with the development of the "through ticket" system, which allowed emigrants to purchase their entire ship and rail passage before leaving their homelands.²⁵ Also important were prepaid passages, whereby those already settled in the United States sent ship and rail tickets back home so that their friends and relatives could join them. Thus, many emigrants who came through Canada had decided before leaving home to go to the United States because of the advantages it offered over Canada—or at least what were represented as advantages by

American emigration agents and advertising—and the purchase of prepaid tickets or through tickets to their destinations in the United States made their decisions irrevocable. When they reached Quebec or other Canadian ports they could not be deflected from their intended purpose, and Canadian immigration officials could do little but provide information, relieve distress, and hurry them on their way. Indeed, in his 1868 report, the Chief Emigration Agent noted that "fully nine-tenths" of the passengers arriving at Quebec by steamer held through tickets to destinations in Canada or the United States sold to them by agents of the steamship lines to whose interest it was to book them to the most distant destination possible.²⁶

These early efforts to convince desirable emigrants to come to and remain in Canada had equivocal results at best, for it proved to be extremely difficult to overcome the real advantages offered by the United States, the competition of Australia and New Zealand, and the burden of land policies which did not serve the interests of the emigrants.²⁷ It was only later in the century, with political consolidation, social and economic development, land reform, and the opening of the western prairie lands, that the tide of emigration flowed more favorably to Canada. But despite the fact that a substantial proportion of emigrants—and at times a vast majority—viewed Canada only as a convenient means to achieve their final destinations in the United States, it is to the great credit of Canada that every effort possible was made, given the large number of emigrants and limited resources, to relieve their suffering, protect them from exploitation, provide them with information, and forward them to their destinations, wherever they might be. Indeed, the sympathetic attitudes and accommodating policies of the Canadian authorities were in marked contrast to the situation at New York and other ports of entry in the United States, where sick and destitute immigrants were simply shipped back to their homelands if friends or relatives were not available to take care of them.

Among the "foreign emigrants"—that is those from outside the United Kingdom—Norwegians (along with the Icelanders) were considered to be the most desirable, and the annual reports contain frequent references to their "inurement to the climate," their "steady industrious habits," their "hardy and economical character," and other real and imagined virtues.²⁸ Determined if erratic efforts were made to induce them to settle in Canada and, while these were to some extent successful, the annual reports frequently note that the "Norwegian emigrants, as in previous years, have nearly all proceeded to the Western States".²⁹ For example, it was estimated that during the nine year period from 1850 to 1858, 26,604 Norwegians had entered Canada, but only 300 had settled there.³⁰

The Canadian immigration authorities recognized the conditions which encouraged the Norwegians to go to the United States, and undertook measures to persuade them that to settle in Canada was to their advantage. They believed that prospective emigrants were "prejudiced" against Canada as a result of the false representations of their own countrymen already settled in the western states, and of American emigration agents.³¹ They became convinced that if prospective emigrants were provided with information about Canada before they had decided on their final destination; if they were met at Quebec by one of their own countrymen who could answer their questions and provide them with information; and if there were Norwegian settlements to which they could be directed and would be naturally attracted, then many of them would certainly choose to settle in Canada rather than going on to the United States.

The matter of settlements was considered to be particularly important and the annual reports contain frequent acknowledgements of the operation of this factor. For example, in his 1853 report at the end of the fourth year of Norwegian emigration to Canada, the Chief Emigration Agent noted:³²

[W]hat indeed is much to be regretted is, that as yet there are so few Norwegians settled in Canada, that with even every incitement to settlement, they find it almost impossible to meet with persons sufficiently conversant with their language to guide or direct them in their views and intentions. Under such circumstances, it is very natural that they should be desirous of availing themselves of very extensive settlements, already opened and inhabited in the state of Wisconsin [sic] by their own countrymen.

The assumptions underlying the emphasis on settlements was clearly stated in the report of a select legislative committee appointed to look into the decline of European emigration to Canada. The committee stated that it had considered the "state and prospects" of the German and Norwegian settlements in Canada, and was convinced "that these nuclei of future strength ought to be multiplied and encouraged from Gaspé to Lake Huron."³³

The growth of such settlements through the attraction of kindred, is as inevitable, if once well established, as the natural increase of the race itself. Such a settlement, consisting of 1000 souls—if it has ample room to spread—will as certainly attract itself 100 others in a season, as a settlement of 100 will attract 10. Whoever has observed the all-powerful action of kindred ties between the deposits of population made by English, Scotch and Irish neighborhoods in this Country, and the annual draft which the new Ireland and new German in the United States make on the parent stock, will be apt to conclude with us, that the best method of recruiting fresh numbers from any given origin, is to be just and generous to those of that origin already settled among us.

The first settlement in Canada, at Sherbrooke in the Eastern Townships, located one hundred miles east of Montreal, was not sponsored by the government but grew up around two Norwegians who settled there in 1853. In his 1854 report, the Chief Emigration Agent noted that "50 to 60 Norwegians" had gone to the Eastern Townships, "the first party of Norwegians of any consequence who have established themselves in Canada," and expressed the hope that they would prove to be "a valuable acquisition to that important section of the province, and moreover be instrumental in attracting to it other parties of their countrymen in succeeding years."³⁴ By 1858, Christopher O. Closter, the Norwegian interpreter with the Chief Emigration Agent at Quebec, reported that there were 25 Norwegian families totaling 126 persons living in this settlement. He noted that while the price charged for the land by the commercial land company was relatively modest, it was still considered by the immigrants to be too high compared to the price for the land available from the government in the "Western States". He recommended that the government "set apart a tract of land" for the Norwegians as an inducement to them to settle, but this was never done and the Eastern Township settlement remained a private undertaking.³⁵

Closter visited the Eastern Township settlement and expressed optimism about the suitability of the area for settlement by Norwegians, and about the future prospects of the little colony. He cautioned, however, that the people in the settlement had told him that "circumstances may present themselves so to them, that they may think it for their advantage to leave," and that nothing would be left undone by those who opposed the settlement of Norwegians in Canada to bring this about.³⁶ Almost all of the settlers eventually left for the United States, and Closter noted that the failure of the settlement had become known in Norway "and has been made use of to show that the cause of the unsuccessful settlement there is because of the unequal character of Canada [compared] to that of the Western States."³⁷

A second area in which the government hoped the Norwegians would settle was the Ottawa district, the country south of the Ottawa river, extending westward from Ottawa city to Lake Huron and

southward toward Lake Ontario. This is a country of many lakes and rivers, and was at that time heavily forested, remote, and sparsely settled. In his 1856 report, the Chief Emigration Agent recommended that Norwegians be settled in the district because "from their steady, industrious habits, they could not but prove a valuable addition to that fine section of the country."³⁸ Later in that year the Canadian government announced in Norwegian newspapers that it had laid three roads into the Ottawa country, which it declared could support a population of eight million people.³⁹ Seeking to paint an attractive picture of what was in fact a vast wilderness, the announcement stated that the soil was "on the whole excellent and fertile" and the climate "very good." The matter of the severe winters was dealt with by equivocation, it being suggested that the snow was "not so deep" that it prevented travel, but indeed facilitated communication throughout the district and increased the fertility of the soil besides. The problem of clearing forests from the land was dealt with by suggesting that the settlers would be rewarded for their toils with the profit from the production of potash from the fallen trees. To attract settlers to this arcadia, the government promised 100 acres of free grants of land to those over 18 years who lived on and brought their grants under cultivation within four years and satisfied certain other conditions. While reports for subsequent years show that a number of parties of Norwegians did proceed to the Ottawa district, the Chief Emigration Agent stated in his 1863 report that while the German settlers there were "progressing favorably," the Norwegians were "abandoning this part of the Province altogether."⁴⁰

The best-known settlement in Canada during this period was at Gaspé, a village on Gaspé Bay at the very tip of the Gaspé Peninsula, which forms the southern embankment of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In 1859, the government, responding to a recommendation from the aforementioned Closter, which the Chief Emigration Agent, encouraged by the early success of the settlements in the Eastern Township, had seconded, made land available for Norwegian settlement at Gaspé. The settlement was intended to provide access for "the hardy fishermen of Norway" to the rich fishing grounds in the waters off the peninsula.⁴¹ By September 1860, 50 Norwegians under Closter's leadership had settled there. The settlement aroused considerable interest in both Norway and Sweden, and it was reported at the end of 1861 that 400 Norwegians and Swedes had settled along Gaspé Bay and adjacent areas in that year alone.⁴² The authorities were cautiously optimistic and many of the settlers enthusiastic about the prospects for the colony. But problems appeared immediately. None of the property fronting on the sea coast was available to the settlers, there were no roads connecting the available property to the main roads, and no community buildings.⁴³ These difficulties, combined with the long winters, primitive wilderness, and severe weather, and the privations suffered by the settlers during the winter of 1861-62 due to a shortage of essential supplies, doomed the colony. Closter, who had moved his family to Gaspé, was sent to purchase supplies but they did not arrive in time and he was blamed by many of the colonists for their sufferings. It was reported at the end of 1862 that "of 300 Norwegian families there remained, last autumn, no more than ten: most of them had gone either to the United States or Upper Canada."⁴⁴

The failure of the Gaspé settlement was a severe disappointment to the Canadian government. One official, the Crown Land Agent at Gaspé, placed the blame entirely on the settlers, and in the only passages critical of the Norwegian emigrants to be found in the emigration reports, stated:⁴⁵

I was greatly deceived by the character of the last Norwegian emigrants, who proved to be but little better than paupers and not over fond of work, very dissatisfied with what was done for them, and expressing in strong terms their being deceived by the Government who, according to their statements, were to provide for them for two or three years in making colonization road, etc. There was evidently some secret agency rendering them discontented with this place; and, turning their attention to the United States, leading them to expect greater encouragement there than in Lower Canada.

While recognizing that there were "other things operating against their settling comfortably, the roads not being finished, and the want of a road from the settlement to Gaspé Basin; their ignorance of our language; no church or minister of their own principles; no schools; ignorance of fishing; many tried and failed, not being able to compete with the resident fishermen" (formidable obstacles indeed), he nevertheless concluded that "they were not the right sort of persons to succeed here, but more suitable for Town or City labor," and characterized the Norwegians at Gaspé "to be of a rambling disposition, very similar to English Gipsies [sic]." The emigration agent at Hamilton, through which passed many of the Norwegians leaving the Ottawa and Gaspé settlements, had a quite different opinion, however. After speaking with these people, many of whom spoke English and "expressed a desire to remain in Canada if they could have thought it possible to make a comfortable living," he concluded that "the localities selected for them are not suited to their tastes and requirements." He urged that the "idea of effecting a large settlement of Norwegians" so that they would be surrounded, as they preferred, by their countrymen, not be abandoned, however.⁴⁶

The failure of the Gaspé colony quickly became known in Norway, and further strengthened the resolve of the emigrants not to settle in Canada. Indeed, in June 1873, the Canadian emigration agent in Norway, commenting on a proposal to establish a Norwegian settlement in Ontario late in that year, warned that "a mistake of this kind at Gaspé, more than [10] years ago, has given to all Canada an evil reputation in Norway which I find it very difficult to displace."⁴⁷ So ended, for the time being at least, efforts to encourage the Norwegian emigrants to remain in Canada by establishing settlements of their countrymen.

To give the Norwegian emigrants "advice and information" for their "interest and protection," and to make Canada "known to them, with the view of getting them to settle within the borders of either Province," Christopher O. Closter was appointed as Norwegian interpreter at Quebec in the spring of 1858, as noted earlier.⁴⁸ Even before his appointment, Closter was an active advocate of Norwegian settlement in Canada, and continued this work in his official capacity. He knew, so he stated in his annual report for 1858, "of no other European emigrants more naturally adapted to the peculiar character and climate of this country than they are," but thought that "owing to the absence of any . . . person to whom they could apply for information, with respect to this country, they were obliged to go to the Western States, where they knew they could be assisted by some of their own country people to purchase land, and otherwise aided to settle down in a strange country." Closter alleged that he was "much surrounded by opposition" and that "great influence [had been] brought to bear" to prevent the settlement of Norwegians in Canada by representatives of the western American states and by agents of the transportation companies who profited from through tickets to the settlements in those states.⁴⁹

Closter urged that the government take steps to induce the settlers to remain in the Eastern Townships settlement and to encourage additional Norwegian settlements in order "to turn the tide of the Norwegian immigration towards this country." He proposed that the government set aside "three townships for the exclusive settlement of Norwegians," each family head to be given 100 acres of free land.⁵⁰ Of these three townships, one was to be in the Eastern Townships, one "on the borders of the Bay of Chaleurs," and one on the north shore of Lake Huron. Closter's idea was that these three areas would provide the emigrants with a choice of occupation, whether it be fishing, farming, mining, or lumbering. There was already a settlement at the Eastern Township, of course, but Closter hoped that promise of a grant of free land would attract additional Norwegians there and stabilize it. The proposal for the Bay of Chaleurs area was, as already noted, taken up by the Chief Emigration Agent, and led to the settlement at Gaspé. Nothing further was found about the proposed settlement tract on Lake Huron.

One of Closter's persistent recommendations was that an official emigration representative be sent to Norway to provide information and advice about settling in Canada to prospective emigrants.⁵¹ Closter himself served in this capacity during the winter of 1860-61. He took with him to Norway "certificates of satisfaction" from the settlers in Gaspé, and gave the colony wide publicity in Norway. Closter's strong advocacy of settlement in Canada did not go unchallenged, however, and he was drawn into a spirited public debate over the issue by a minister from Stavanger, who had held a pastorate in a settlement in Wisconsin.⁵² Closter's efforts did result in a few families emigrating to Gaspé, and he returned there with his family in the fall of 1861, as noted earlier. Closter was preceded as the official emigration agent in Norway by Helge Haugen, who arrived in March, 1860. Haugen, a native of Norway, had lived in Quebec since 1843, and was therefore well-acquainted with Canada's advantages and disadvantages for settlement by Norwegians. Like Closter, Haugen travelled widely, distributing printed information and urging prospective emigrants to settle in Canada, particularly in the settlements in the Ottawa and Gaspé districts.⁵³

Meanwhile at Quebec, Closter was succeeded as interpreter by his former business associate, A. Jorgensen, who served as "foreign interpreter" for German as well as Scandinavian immigrants. In his report for 1864, Jorgensen noted the continued flow of Norwegian emigrants to the "Western States," commenting that the advantages of Canada in no way could overcome the "inducements held out to them by families and friends there." He urged the establishment of "a nucleus settlement, where the strangers might find people speaking their own language and where they are assured and protected by the presence of some countryman of standing and influence."⁵⁴ Jorgensen also commented on the large number of destitute Norwegian emigrants, ascribing the "recklessness with which persons without means emigrate" to the sure knowledge that they would receive assistance upon arrival in Quebec.⁵⁵ Jorgensen's service as foreign interpreter at Quebec ended with his death in the fall of 1866.⁵⁶

While serving as foreign interpreter at Quebec, Jorgensen wrote a pamphlet entitled The Emigration From Europe During the Present Century: Its Causes and Effects, which was published in Quebec in 1865.⁵⁷ The pamphlet provides a good descriptive overview of the emigration from Norway up to the early 1860's, and is worth summarizing here. Jorgensen found that most emigrants were between the ages of 30 and 40, with a larger proportion of men than women. The proportion of children per 100 emigrants was greater than that per 100 of the population in Norway, indicating a heavy proportion of families. Most of emigrants were from the country districts in central Norway, particularly from the higher mountain ranges, and consisted of poor laborers and tenent farmers, but with a few prosperous farmers also. The first and foremost cause of emigration, Jorgensen continued, was the difficulty and even impossibility of earning a living, due primarily to the inhospitable natural conditions of the country. Many of the emigrants did not expect to improve their own condition in America, but hoped that their children might have a better chance of doing so. But many who were unable in Norway to rise above their circumstances were inspired to do so in America by the greater opportunities, future hope, and by the example of so many Norwegians who had found good fortune in America. Jorgensen noted that the cost of the Atlantic passage for an adult was 15 to 27 dollars, plus 12 dollars for subsistence. The mortality on the Norwegian ships during the crossing was higher than on ships from other nations due to overcrowding and perhaps also to the weakened physical condition of the people because of the famine in the mountain districts in 1861-62. Jorgensen stated that despite the heavy drain of emigration, Norway's population had continued to increase, and even more so in the period of heaviest emigration. He concluded that "On the whole it is supposed that Norway's gain by emigration had been equally as large as its loss of money and labour-power, particularly through the increase of her mercantile marine, caused by the extended freight trade with Canada and the United States."⁵⁸

In 1862, the government withdrew all of its emigration agents from Europe, presumably including Norway, in accord with a recommendation of a legislative committee which found that the number and quality of immigrants arriving in Canada as a result of the agents' work did not justify their cost.⁵⁹ After confederation in 1867, the new federal government once again undertook an active campaign to attract immigrants to Canada. The land problem was resolved by a law patterned on the U.S. Homestead Act of 1862, subsidies were provided to the passenger ship companies to support reduction of trans-Atlantic fares, and emigration agents were sent back to Europe.⁶⁰ In February 1872, Henry L. Hertz was appointed emigration agent in Scandinavia, arriving in Denmark in April.⁶¹ He travelled widely through that country and Norway and Sweden, distributing informational materials, placing newspapers advertisements, and talking to prospective emigrants. His conclusion as a result of this work was that neither "the government or the public generally look friendly on any emigration scheme; and I soon found out that it would take more than extra-ordinary means, and a very full support from the Dominion Government, to succeed in business here."⁶² The government did, however, undertake some new approaches to encouraging emigration. One of these was "assisted passages" by which the major passenger carrying lines received a government subsidy to reduce trans-Atlantic fares for selected emigrants.⁶³ The commission paid to the agents who booked the ship passages was also increased to encourage them to persuade emigrants to go to Canada rather than to distant destinations in the United States, which it was in the agents' self-interest to do.⁶⁴

Hertz was succeeded as the agent for Scandinavia in early 1873 by William McDougal, who had been active in the movement for confederation and had served as governor of Ontario. McDougal, like Hertz, warned his government that "emigration and emigration agents are not popular," pointing out that just as in Canada, the efforts of those "who are endeavouring to persuade the people that they are badly off and badly treated in the old homestead, and have only to cross the ocean and enter a political and social paradise" were not looked upon "with complacency."⁶⁵ McDougal negotiated the assisted passage agreements with the passenger carrying lines, and arranged for the appointment of agents in the principal emigrant ports of the three Scandinavian countries. Under his instructions to make "special arrangements" to promote migration to Canada, he sent a large party of emigrants on a sailing vessel at an extremely low fare. But low fares could not compensate for the unhealthy conditions and lengthy passage time then inescapably associated with sailing vessels, and the plan was not repeated.

Although contract labor was forbidden by law in all of the Scandinavian countries, the Canadian government in the spring of 1873 encouraged a private iron firm in Canada to recruit men in Norway to work a year in its iron works in exchange for passage to Canada.⁶⁶ When they arrived in Canada the emigrants found that conditions were not as they had been represented, and complained to the Swedish-Norwegian counsel. Some of those who refused to carry out their part of the contract were imprisoned while others made their way to the United States. The report of the Swedish-Norwegian counsel to his government resulted in legal action against the organizers of the scheme. The resulting publicity in Norway and in the Norwegian-American communities in the United States tarnished Canada's image as a haven for emigrants from Norway. McDougal was also involved in schemes to establish Norwegian colonies in Canada, but these were unsuccessful. Despite what proved to be but limited results, McDougal was optimistic about his efforts to encourage migration from Scandinavia to Canada, commenting lyrically in his 1873 report that "the success or failure of one of the most important movements of modern times—the exodus of the vigorous descendents of the 'Vikings' and 'Danes', who conquered England and Scotland in the ancient time, from their original home to a new and 'greater Britain' in the West may depend largely upon the arrangements I am endeavouring to complete."⁶⁷

McDougal's appointment ended in April 1874, although he was in Scandinavia only until the fall of 1873, operating thereafter from London. He was followed in Scandinavia in September of that year

by a well-known Swedish-American, Hans Mattson, a former Civil War colonel and secretary of state for Minnesota. Mattson continued McDougal's work, but his particular interest was in implanting Scandinavian colonies in Canada. In his 1874 report he echoed the observation made by so many of the emigration agents and officials before him, that the Scandinavians preferred to settle with their own countrymen and that once settlements for them were established "the work of emigration goes on without any effort or expense to the Government."⁶⁸ He was involved in schemes to establish a Norwegian and a Danish settlement in Canada under the leadership of Lutheran clergymen, but neither of these came to fruition.⁶⁹ Mattson served for two years, until September of 1875, after which the idea of a special agent in Scandinavia appears to have been abandoned, at least for the time being.


It is the judgment of scholars of Canadian immigration policy that the special efforts undertaken during the period covered by this study to attract Norwegians and other Scandinavians to Canada were not successful.⁷⁰ Certainly no stable settlement of Norwegians was established during this time, and the publicity, assisted passages, bonuses, special agents, and other inducements had no significant effect on the size or the direction of migration from Norway. The size of the emigrant stream was determined primarily by the traditional "push-pull" factors—primarily economic in nature—and its direction continued to be to the large Norwegian settlements in the American midwest.

TRANSPORTING THE EMIGRANTS

The distance from Oslo, Norway, to Quebec is approximately 3,600 nautical miles, depending on the route of a vessel across the north Atlantic.^{70a} Of this total distance, some 2,800 miles is open ocean, say to Cape Ray on Newfoundland Island, and the remainder of the distance from there through the Gulf of St. Lawrence and up that river to Quebec. The important consideration for the emigrants, however, was not the distance but the sailing time, which for a sailing vessel was measured in weeks or even months. From 1850 to 1874 (except 1867), the yearly average sailing time for ships from Norway recorded in the annual emigration reports varied from a high of 58 days to a low of 39 days, with the most frequent average time of passage exceeding 50 days and the average time for all years except one exceeding 40 days. Or, to put it another way, in 19 of the 24 years, the average passage time recorded was between 45 and 58 days, that is, roughly between six and eight weeks.

It was during these endless weeks spent on sailing ships crossing from the old to the new world that for countless emigrants from Norway and the other nations of Europe the dream of a new life turned into a nightmare of terror, sickness, and death. Indeed, the transportation of emigrants to North America during the first 70 years of the 19th century was accomplished by human suffering of unparalleled dimensions, brought about by the unfortunate conjunction of several factors: the ignorance, powerlessness, poverty, and poor physical condition of the emigrants; the greed and inhumanity of the ship owners to whom the emigrants were just another species of cargo to be transported with as little fuss and cost as possible; the wooden sailing ship, which at its best was slow, damp, and cramped, with poor sea-going qualities and hostage to wind and weather; the crews of these ships, often composed of inhuman and unprincipled men; and the indifference of governments.⁷¹

As noted earlier, emigrant transport did not begin as a trade in its own right, but as a sideline to the movement of bulk cargoes and manufactured goods between Europe and North America. Ship owners engaged in carrying large volume bulk cargo (such as timber) to Europe found that the cost of the return voyages could be defrayed by carrying emigrants in holds which would otherwise be empty or only partly filled by cargoes of low volume manufactured goods or processed raw materials such as iron. The ships were therefore not designed or intended to carry passengers, but were converted to that purpose for the return voyage. A temporary floor was laid on the ship's frames, often directly over



Bark "Nornen" Built 1850
Norsk Sjøfarts Museum Oslo



Bark "Caroline" Built 1865
Norsk Sjøfarts Museum Oslo

stinking and filthy ballest, wooden bunks intended to accommodate from four to six people each were jury-rigged, while on deck primitive toilet, washing, and cooking facilities were erected.

Into these dark and narrow spaces were crammed scores, and often hundreds, of men, women, and children, without distinction as to age, sex, or physical condition, along with their food and water for the voyage (which they supplied themselves) and the few belongings which they were allowed to take with them. With little light, breathing foul air, without the most elementary amenities, brutalized by the crew, suffering the agonies of sea sickness, and terrified by being penned in these quarters during storms, the emigrants endured voyages of from 30 to 60 days and occasionally much longer. Disease often raged unchecked among the debilitated passengers, malnutrition was common, and starvation not unknown. Death stalked these ships and uncounted numbers of emigrants who had set out with such hope ended their lives in these floating charnel houses and were buried at sea—or simply dumped overboard without the dignity of burial. As Friedrich Kapp, long a Commissioner of Emigration for the State of New York, stated, "If crosses and tombstones could be erected on the water as on the Western deserts, where they indicate the resting places of white men killed by savages or by the elements, the whole route of the emigrant vessel from Europe to America would long since have assumed the appearance of crowded cemeteries."⁷²

For the Norwegians, the only possibly mitigating factor to this general description of the horrors of many emigrant voyages was that the masters and crews of their ships were also Norwegian. At the same time, the timber ships were probably worse than the general run of cargo-carrying sailing vessels used to transport emigrants, for carrying timber was often the last stop of an old hulk on its way to the ship graveyard.⁷³ Indeed, it has been said of these ships that they were kept afloat as much by their cargoes of timber as by their hulls. Additionally, the Norwegian ship owners delayed the conversion from sail to steam long after emigrants from the United Kingdom and the continent were being carried in fast steamers, and successfully delayed enactment of a law to protect the emigrants during the voyage until 1863. The overall result was that while conditions on board the Norwegian vessels were perhaps no worse than on those coming from other ports in Europe, they continued long after the latter had been improved through the steamship and strict laws governing the transport of emigrants.

According to the emigration reports, the annual average tons burden of Norwegian sailing vessels—a useful measure of their size—arriving at Quebec from 1850 to 1872 ranged from a low of 294 to a high of 610, and for most of these years lay between 400 and 600.⁷⁴ In his discussion of the emigrant trade to Canada, Worm-Muller provides a list of 35 Norwegian sailing vessels which arrived in Quebec in 1868, and the Norsk Sjøfartsmuseum was able to locate dimensional data for some of these ships, as shown in Table 3.⁷⁵

Table 3

Dimensions of Norwegian Ships
Arriving at Quebec in 1868

Name	Lasts (burden)	Length (feet)	Width (feet)	Number of Emigrants
Argonaut	314	148	29	260
Anna Delius	337	148	31	385
Amelia	302	137	29	256
Argo	296	145	31	235
Manilla	230	148	29	232
Nornen	189	106	28	227
New Brunswick	233	128	29	286
Neptunus	303	131	30	374
Caroline	268	128	25	302
Claus Heftye	435	152	34	479
Heros	282	170	32	300

These data clearly reveal how small these vessels were, and how crowded it must have been for the relatively large number of emigrants they carried. It should be kept in mind that in addition to the steerage passengers and their baggage, these ships carried a crew, provisions, equipment and supplies to operate the vessel, perhaps a cargo of merchandise or iron, and a few cabin passengers. The conditions which must have prevailed on the 131 foot Neptunus which carried 374 immigrants on a 63 day journey from Skien to Quebec in 1868 can easily be imagined. In the same year, 1868, the average tons burden of the 15 sailing ships arriving from the United Kingdom was 839. These vessels carried only 155 of 20,682 emigrants from the United Kingdom, however, the remainder arriving by steamer. Indeed, large numbers of emigrants from the United Kingdom began arriving by steamers in 1856, and these ships very quickly came to dominate the emigrant trade from the United Kingdom.⁷⁶ Thus, for 1859, the first year for which separate data on steamer and sailing ship arrivals are available in the emigration reports, 71 percent of the 6,056 emigrants from the United Kingdom arrived by steamer, the proportion increasing each year thereafter reaching 99 percent in 1865.

The iron-hull steamer—dry, seaworthy, commodious, and fast compared to the sailing vessel—eliminated some of the principal factors responsible for the high level of sickness and mortality among emigrants on traditional sailing vessels. Indeed, the introduction of the steamer brought with it an overall improvement in the conditions in which emigrants were transported. Other factors besides the steamers were involved in this, however. The expensive steamers could only be purchased by larger firms who if for no other reason than economic self-interest conducted business more responsibly than the individuals or partnerships which owned many of the sailing ships. They were encouraged in this by the intense competition among the companies in what rapidly became a regularized passenger carrying trade. Also, stricter laws to protect passengers during voyages were enacted in Great Britain and the United States. The overall result, then, was a substantial improvement in the lot of the emigrant steerage passenger traveling from the United Kingdom to North America, although complaints and investigations continued until the end of large-scale emigration with World War I.

Unfortunately, the Norwegians coming to Quebec directly from Norway did not share in this revolution. The refusal of the Norwegian ship owners to change from sail to steam even though their foreign competitors had done so has been explained by a variety of economic, psychological, and even romantic factors.⁷⁷ Whatever the reasons, the emigrants they transported in their outmoded vessels paid a terrible price in sickness and death. After the change to steamer for emigrant transport from the United Kingdom, Norwegians transported directly from Norway usually accounted for the majority of those detained in quarantine at Grosse Isle. In 1869, for example, 35 of the 40 vessels inspected at the quarantine station came from Norway, and 70.6% of those detained there were from Norwegian vessels. The point is even more forcefully demonstrated by the mortality rates for vessels from Scandinavia compared to the mortality rates for vessels from the United Kingdom. Table 4 shows the number and percent of deaths in quarantine and during the voyage for passengers on vessels from Scandinavia and the United Kingdom from 1850 to 1874. As noted earlier, 1856 was the first year substantial numbers of emigrants arrived by steamers from the United Kingdom. As shown by the data, the death rates for those ships (deaths as a percentage of the total number of passengers carried) for 1856 through 1858 were much lower than for any previous years, and after 1858 the rate never rose above one-tenth of one percent. The point can be further dramatized by comparing 1850, when 207 of 30,949 emigrants from the United Kingdom died in quarantine and during the voyage, to 1872, when only four out of approximately the same number—30,011—died.⁷⁸ There was, however, no comparable change in the death rate on ships carrying emigrants from Scandinavia, all but a very few of which would have come from Norway. In some years, the differences in the death rates for ships from Scandinavia and from the United Kingdom were dramatic—for example, in 1862, 226 of 5,442 emigrants on vessels from Scandinavia died, while only seven of 14,408 on ships from the United Kingdom died.

Table 4
Deaths Among Immigrants from Scandinavia
and the United Kingdom in Passage and in
Quarantine, 1850-1874

Year	From Scandinavia			From the U.K.		
	Passengers*	Total Deaths	% Deaths	Passengers*	Total Deaths	% Deaths
1850	244	0		30,949	207	.67
1851	227	2	.88	39,356	256	.65
1852	2,216	19	.86	30,866	130	.42
1853	5,093	37	.73	28,926	179	.61
1854	5,888	39	.67	41,208	419	1.02
1855	1,276	9	.71	15,813	94	.59
1856	2,825	19	.67	14,869	34	.23
1857	6,507	100	1.54	20,786	81	.39
1858	2,665	9	.34	9,045	27	.29
1859	1,761	5	.29	6,067	2	.03
1860	1,800	19	1.05	7,837	3	.04
1861	8,853	186	2.10	9,309	4	.04
1862	5,442	226	4.15	14,408	7	.05
1863	1,119	6	.54	15,231	6	.04
1864	5,263	49	.93	11,675	10	.09
1865	3,394	14	.41	16,586	7	.04
1866	13,588	82	.60	11,695	8	.07
1867	no report					
1868	9,601	198	2.06	20,693	11	.05
1869	8,643	90	1.04	33,509	33	.07
1870	9,023	38	.42	35,094	21	.06
1871	5,418	32	.59	31,598	11	.03
1872	3,731	30	.80	30,011	4	.01
1873	2,029	19	.94	34,181	13	.04
1874	523	17	3.25	22,642	17	.08

*Includes steerage and cabin passengers embarked plus births during passage.

The sickness and deaths among the immigrants arriving from Norway were a matter of serious concern to the Canadian emigration authorities. In his reports for 1861 and 1862, when mortality among the Norwegians was extremely high (2.10 percent and 4.15 percent respectively) the Chief Emigration Agent at Quebec complained of the overcrowding on the Norwegian ships, "the neglect of the simplest precautions for the preservation of health on the voyage," and the fact that ships from foreign ports were not subject to inspection under the British passenger act.⁷⁹ In 1861 he reported the overcrowding and high mortality on the Norwegian vessels to the Swedish-Norwegian consul, and it was the consul's report which was instrumental in finally convincing the Norwegian government to take steps to protect the health and welfare of the emigrants during the ocean voyage.

PROTECTING THE EMIGRANTS

In an effort to provide some protection for the emigrants against the hazard and abuses of voyages, the British and American governments enacted a series of "passengers acts" regulating the transportation of passengers on sailing vessels.⁸⁰ These laws were shaped by a complex interaction of humanitarian values and economic interests under the relentless pressure of an ever-increasing volume of emigration. Periodic reports of terrible suffering and death on board particular vessels, or of an emigration season attended by great catastrophe, would strengthen the hand of those who placed humanitarian considerations first, and a new law would be enacted or an existing one strengthened. When the concern and support generated by such crises had faded, the opposition of the shipowners and others who profited from the transport of emigrants would often result in the laws being vitiated by amendment or interpretation, or in their application.

The first British passenger act was approved by Parliament in 1803, and included provisions to prevent overcrowding and to insure that adequate supplies of food and water were carried on board ship.⁸¹ This law provided only minimum protection for the emigrants, however, and in the following years it was gradually expanded in scope, although there were unfortunate periods of backsliding during which the law and its enforcement were weakened—and for one year entirely repealed—with inevitable disastrous consequences for the emigrants. Finally, in 1842 a comprehensive emigrant protection law was adapted. To control overcrowding it specified that the "passenger density" on board a vessel could be no more than three passengers for each five tons burden, each passenger to have at least ten square feet of deck space, and established minimum food and water provisions, prohibited spirits on board vessels, provided for the licensing of ticket agents and brokers, and so on. Vessels were to be inspected prior to departure, and again upon arrival in Canada by the emigration officers there (as already noted) to insure that the requirements of the law were observed.

The first American passenger act was approved by Congress in 1819.⁸² It provided that no vessel, American or foreign, conveying passengers to or from the United States could carry more than two persons for every five tons burden, and specified the minimum stocks of food and water which were to be carried.⁸³ This act, minimal as it was and in practice less than vigorously enforced, remained in force for almost three decades. Among its defects (and also that of the earlier British passenger acts) was that it specified passenger density only in terms of a ship's burden. Ships could be and were loaded to the limit of that requirement, despite the fact that baggage, provisions, and cargo left little actual clear deck space for each person, while berths were erected three high in every available space, leaving very little vertical and horizontal distance between them.

In 1847, Congress passed a new passenger act which continued the passenger density provision of the 1819 act but added the requirement that each passenger must also have at least fourteen square feet of deck space, and specified the arrangement and size of berths. But in 1848 Congress passed still

another act which while stricter in many respects than the 1847 act, eliminated the tonnage requirement in the passenger density formula, which was not restored until 1853. Meanwhile, the severe overcrowding on emigrant vessels continued. Hanson notes that the stricter requirements of the 1847 American act compared to the 1819 act caused a crisis among European shipowners and contributed to the diversion of the emigrant stream to Canada.⁸⁴ By the time information about the new law reached them in the spring of 1847 they had already entered into emigrant contracts for the coming season. Unable to find the additional shipping which would enable them to meet the new requirements, they diverted their vessels to Quebec where they would not be subject to any passenger laws (unless they had come from a British port). From Quebec they arranged to have the emigrants transported overland to New York or to the midwest via the Great Lakes.

These British and American emigrant protection laws had an important but ironical impact on the Norwegian emigrant trade. As noted earlier, the American laws were responsible for deflecting the emigrant stream from New York. At the same time, the fact that the British law which was enforced at Quebec applied only to vessels departing from British ports made that an acceptable destination for Norwegian vessels coming directly from Norway. It certainly would have been expensive, and perhaps prohibitively so, if the Norwegian timber ships which carried emigrants to Quebec had been required to meet the standards of the British law. Thus, the British and American laws, rather than providing protection to the emigrants on board the Norwegian vessels, served merely as a stimulus to the Norwegian ship-owners to change the route of their vessels to preserve their own economic self-interest at the expense of the lives and welfare of the emigrants which they carried on their ships.

The Norwegian government, early in the development of emigration from that country, had in fact recognized the need for an emigrant protection law. In 1843, in response to information from the consul in Havre, France, concerning the destitute condition of the Norwegians who came to that port to take ship to the United States, and about the terrible overcrowding on the emigrant ships, the government appointed a commission to prepare a proposed law.⁸⁵ The commission's draft law, which Blegen characterized as "[On] the whole. . . both liberal and comprehensive," included two major sections, one on emigration regulation and a second on emigrant protection. In the first section, the right of every citizen to emigrate was reaffirmed, but the exercise of that right was qualified by the need to protect public and private interests which might be affected by the emigration of particular classes of individuals (e.g., public officials), by family members in particular situations (e.g., a husband leaving against his wife's wishes), and of debtors.

In preparing the second section on emigrant protection, the commission studied the British passenger act of 1842 and similar acts of other nations. Indeed, its proposal was in some respects more comprehensive than the British law. It included a passenger density formula based both on a vessel's burden and on deck space; stipulated food and water supplies and cooking facilities; provided for medical supplies, cleanliness and sanitation; specified the size and arrangement of berths; regulated the loading and types of cargo; placed on the ship's captain the responsibility of insuring that the emigrants on his ship had sufficient funds so that they would not become public burdens in a foreign country; provided for medical examinations of crew and passengers and for inspection of a vessel before departure; and placed enforcement of the law under the jurisdiction of the police and maritime authorities. It is important to note that the proposed law was to apply to passenger vessels going to "foreign continents," that is to ports outside of Europe.

The draft law on emigration was brought to the Storting in early 1845, and referred to the committee on trade, which recommended that the section on emigration regulation be omitted, since its purposes could be better accomplished through existing laws. In this connection, it should be noted that

no attempt was ever made to restrict emigration on a comprehensive basis. Indeed, over the years various obstructions to emigration, such as the passport law, were eliminated. On the assumption that prospective emigrants were perhaps more aware of the potential benefits of emigration than of its disadvantages, the approach of the government was to bring to their attention information regarding the unavoidable difficulties and inevitable hazards attending it in the hope that emigration would thereby be discouraged.

When the proposed law on emigrant protection was brought before the Odelsting, the lower house of the Storting, a motion to table was carried, so the measure died. It is not possible to know at this remove which of the arguments against the measure were most responsible for this outcome, but surely those based on economic interests must have been crucial, as they often were in the debates over emigrant protection legislation in the United Kingdom and the United States. It was argued that if the proposed law were adopted, the cost of the journey to the emigrant would necessarily rise, and the emigrants would go to ports in Sweden or other countries to the detriment of Norwegian shipping. It was further argued that the proposed law was unnecessary since the ships would improve as the emigrant trade developed, and the competition between the shipping companies would insure that the emigrants had an opportunity to choose good ships, and that in any case the American passenger law covered some of the provisions of the proposed law. These arguments were partly, if not wholly specious, and clearly reflected the interests of the ship owners.⁸⁶ While some emigrants did go to foreign ports to obtain passage to America, this was an expensive and difficult alternative for them, unlikely to be pursued by many. The transporting of emigrants was not considered by the ship owners as a regular trade, but as an adjunct to their main business of carrying timber or other cargo. Their vessels were suited to that purpose and only temporarily adapted for carrying emigrants, and it was unlikely that competition for the emigrant trade—particularly since the emigrants had little bargaining power—would result in much improvement in the ships. Finally, the 1819 American law had proven to be inadequate for protecting the emigrants. In any case, since this law was applied at the port of arrival rather than departure, it provided no protection to the emigrants if a ship owner decided to risk evading the law when the vessel arrived in the United States, which was not difficult, or to make the journey so profitable that any fine under the law could be paid with a good profit remaining.

In the years after 1845, the Norwegian government had the matter of emigration protection repeatedly brought to its attention, and could not have been completely unaware of the destitute condition of many of the emigrants nor the deplorable conditions on board some of the vessels carrying them to Canada. Nothing further was done, however, until a report was received in 1862 from the Swedish-Norwegian consul in Quebec who (as previously noted) had been advised by the Chief Emigration Agent at Quebec of the poverty, sickness, and death among the emigrants arriving there on Norwegian vessels in 1861. Among 8,853 passengers on 40 Norwegian vessels which arrived that year, 175 died during the voyage and 11 in quarantine. Of the 186 dead, 104 were on eight vessels which together carried 611 more passengers than the British passenger act allowed had it applied. The situation was even worse in 1862, when there were 226 deaths among the 5,442 passengers on 29 Norwegian vessels.⁸⁷ The Chief Emigration Agent also complained that many Norwegian emigrants arrived without sufficient means to continue their journey.

Finally roused to action, the government sent to the Storting a revised version of the emigrant protection law proposed in 1843. It was the judgment of the committee to which the proposal was referred that the treatment of the emigrants by shipowners and captains since 1845 had been "on the whole not unfavorable," but that "there will be no mistake in assuming that there has during the same time gradually formed a widespread conviction about the advisability of protecting the emigration trade."⁸⁸ Indeed, the committee suggested that the shipowners and captains might even favor such

protection, since it would afford them "a defense against unfair reputation." The Storting approved the proposed law without serious opposition in May of 1863. In 1865, an attempt was made to delete a provision of the law specifying the special containers to be used for herring and dried fish transported on passenger vessels to protect the emigrants from the odors of these products. At stake here were the interests of the fishing industry, which was trying at this time to develop its markets in North America. The attempt failed, however. As Ingrid Semmingsen has stated with respect to the 1863 emigrant protection law: "This time consideration for the passengers and their welfare on board [the ships] triumphed over economic interests, and the emigrants benefited during the last years of the sailing ship trade from the law which had been rejected twenty years earlier."⁸⁹

The only other significant emigration protection law to be adapted during the next three decades was one to control the activities of steamship company agents. As early as 1861, an agent of the Allan Line, an Atlantic passenger line, was doing business in Norway, and after 1863 agents of other foreign lines—Wilson, Inman, Hamburg-American, and others—were operating in Norway. These agents and subagents, and those of the Norwegian shipping companies, travelled around the country encouraging emigration and signing up emigrants. The competition became so fierce and fraudulent practices so common that the government in 1867 promulgated provisional regulations for the control of these emigration agents, and in 1869 these were embodied in law by the Storting. The law required each agent to register and make a security deposit with the police, and to complete a detailed contract with each emigrant which had to be certified by the police.⁹⁰

A NEW ERA: TRANS-SHIPMENT AND THE STEAMSHIP

The activity of the agents of foreign steamship companies in Norway presaged a change both in the kind of ship on which the emigrants travelled, and in the emigration route. The route the agents represented was not the traditional direct one from Norway to Quebec by sailing ship, but an indirect one by steamship via Hamburg, London, Liverpool, or Glasgow, and terminating in Quebec or New York or some other major North American port. Of these routes, the most frequently used was the one from Norway to Hull on the east coast of England, across England by train to Liverpool, and departure from that port on a large steamship of one of the Atlantic passenger lines for the trip to Canada or the United States.⁹¹

Emigrants were collected from the major ports of Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger, and Christiania, and transported across the North Sea in steamers.⁹² The agents of each of the Atlantic lines took charge of the emigrants with whom they had contracts, arranging for space aboard the steamers. When a steamer departed from Norway, the authorities and agents in Hull were notified by telegraph so that arrangements for their reception and rail transportation could be made. The usual time of departure from Norway was Friday evening, with arrival in Hull on Sunday afternoon or evening, although occasionally a vessel was delayed until Monday morning. Typical of the vessels used on this North Sea route was the small steamer Tasso, belonging to the Wilson Line. One emigrant who travelled on the Tasso has left the following impressions of the ship.⁹³

The third-class accommodations consisted of two large rooms, one for men, the other for women; each had a thick layer of sawdust on the floor and bunks overhead. The sawdust was a puzzle at first, but as the ship crossed the North sea its utility was demonstrated. The bunks were partitioned, each section accommodating four persons. None had a mattress, springs, or sheets, but they were liberally supplied with blankets recently returned from a steam laundry. Though all were clean, carcasses indicated that recently they had been well populated with vermin. Each passenger was supplied with a plate and other necessary equipment for food which was ladled out from huge containers. It was plain, quite well-cooked food, and youthful appetite is seldom critical.

At Hull, the passengers remained on board overnight, although the men would typically go ashore to see the sights. On Monday morning the emigrants and their luggage were disembarked and taken in charge by agents of the various Atlantic lines on which they were booked. They were taken to boarding houses to eat, after which they went to the railroad station to embark on the trains which would take them across England to Liverpool (or less frequently to Glasgow). In this early period, the rail journey could take the greater part of a day. Another emigrant has described the trip to Liverpool in the following way:⁹⁴

The area we traveled through was pretty in the beginning. The fields were green, the properties were divided by hedgerows of hawthorn. We passed town after town, I don't know how many. They were black and smokey because of the numerous manufacturing plants and factories. We only stopped in a few larger places, among them Sheffield, which looked like a forest of smokestacks from the various factories. We went through seven or eight tunnels, one of which took fifteen minutes to get through. The noise was deafening, and it was awful, but it was a lively disruption of the trip. The rest of the countryside we passed through was more rolling, with deep valleys and high hills. Everything flew past us because the train traveled at a terrible speed, which we were not used to.

In Liverpool, the emigrants were taken to the boarding houses of the respective Atlantic lines to await departure of their ships. The delay could be several days long, which was provided for by the emigration contract. The emigrants typically spent their time wandering around the city seeing what to most of them, coming from the isolated rural areas of Norway as they did, must have been wonderful things.

As noted earlier, the shift in the emigration route to trans-shipment through England was reflected in the statistics of arrivals of Scandinavians at Quebec. The shift is also apparent in data on emigrant departures from Norway by sailing ship or steamer. Again, during the period under consideration, the Norwegian shipping companies did not use steamers on the direct route from Norway to Canada, and emigrant departures by steamers would have been for trans-shipment through England. Table 5 shows the total departures from Norway by steamer and by sailing ship from 1866 (the first year for which separate data are available) to 1875 from the major ports of Christiania, Bergen, Trondheim, and Stavanger. The rapid increase in the number of departures on steamers and the parallel decline in departures on sailing vessels during this period is apparent. With respect to individual ports, for Christiania the number of emigrants departing on steamers exceeded the number on sailing ships for the first time in 1869, and after 1874 there were no more departures on sailing ships; the comparable years for Bergen were 1872 and 1873, and for Trondheim, 1868 and 1871. The data in Table 5 also reveal the progressive concentration of emigrant departures in the major ports as the steamships which transported the emigrant parties to England for trans-shipment replaced the sailing vessels which took them directly to North America.

Table 5
Departures from Major Ports in Norway by
Sailing Ship and Steamship, 1866-1875

Year		Christiania	Stavanger	Bergen	Trondheim	Other	Totals
1866	Sail	3,939	736	4,644	1,404	2,825	13,548
	Steam	1,708	0	0	471	0	2,179
1867	Sail	5,212	456	2,714	1,094	2,274	11,750
	Steam	1,221	0	0	246	16	1,483
1868	Sail	4,461	667	1,892	690	2,034	9,744
	Steam	3,861	0	63	780	71	4,775
1869	Sail	3,896	383	1,654	624	2,030	8,587
	Steam	8,547	24	475	2,205	364	11,615
1870	Sail	3,363	980	2,206	320	2,028	8,897
	Steam	5,046	13	249	1,804	235	7,347
1871	Sail	1,647	1,141	1,323	315	970	5,396
	Steam	5,020	72	667	1,401	537	7,697
1872	Sail	1,614	681	1,099	0	727	4,121
	Steam	5,998	207	1,648	1,839	591	10,283
1873	Sail	1,344	—	341	0	612	2,297
	Steam	4,783	—	1,869	1,828	389	8,869
1874	Sail	269	243	0	0	0	512
	Steam	2,339	95	1,259	668	81	4,442
1875	Sail	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Steam	2,098	313	1,132	722	138	4,403
TOTAL Sail		25,745	5,287	15,873	4,447	13,500	64,852
Steam		40,621	724	7,362	11,964	2,422	63,093

Source: Folkemaendens Bevaegelse I Aarene 1856-1875. Upgivne af Department for Det Indre.
Table No. 6, p. 80

THE ARRIVAL AT QUEBEC AND THE INLAND JOURNEY

After the long journey up the St. Lawrence, the first stop for the emigrant vessel was the quarantine station on Grosse Isle, 33 miles below Quebec.⁹⁵ Here the steerage passengers received medical inspection, the sick were removed and, if necessary, the ship was fumigated and bedding washed or discarded. Those who were unfortunate enough to be quarantined were released when they had regained their health. However, the primitive state of medical knowledge, the limited facilities on Grosse Isle, the poor physical condition of the emigrants, and the virulence of the diseases which raged in the crowded and unsanitary conditions of the ships, meant that many never left Grosse Isle, but were buried there in unmarked graves, their fate probably unknown to their families and friends who had continued onwards. From Grosse Isle the ship proceeded to Quebec, a journey of one or two or even three days in a sailing vessel. There they were inspected by a customs official and if the vessel fell under the British passenger act, by the Chief Emigration Agent or his assistant. When the vessel was cleared by these inspectors, the emigrants were free to disembark. Although they had a legal right to remain on board for 48 hours, most left the ship as soon as possible, their departure often unceremoniously expedited by the crew.

The relief of the destitute among the arriving emigrants was a serious problem for the authorities at Quebec. A great many—in some years almost all—of the emigrants from the United Kingdom were from the poorest classes, with few material possessions and no cash, mal-nourished and in poor health, with no skills for which they could be employed. Many from Ireland and Scotland had been dispossessed by the enclosure acts, and shipped to Canada by their landlords, who paid their fare to Quebec but made no provision for their subsistence after they arrived or for continuing their journey to a place of settlement.⁹⁶ While there were a few prosperous farmers among them, the Norwegians too generally came from the poorer elements of the agricultural population—subsistence farmers, tenant farmers, farm laborers and maids. Some received tickets and money from relatives or friends already in the United States, and some collected money which had been deposited for them when they arrived at Quebec. For those who arrived penniless, the emigration authorities paid their passage inland, whether their final destination was in Canada or the "western states." Some of those who were provided with free passage had been promised by friends or relatives that funds would be deposited for them at Quebec, but the promises had not been kept.

Many were victims of a particularly vicious fraud practiced by ticket agents and vessel owners. They would tell prospective emigrants that they needed to purchase tickets only to Quebec, and that there they would be provided with free passage inland by the Canadian government. This scheme was abetted by those already in the United States, who wrote to their friends and relatives in Norway that they had benefited from this policy.⁹⁷ The result was that beginning in the early 1850's, large numbers of Norwegians arrived at Quebec with no means to proceed beyond, anticipating that free passage west would be provided by the Canadian authorities. Indeed, in every year but one from 1858 through 1866, the proportion of the total number of Norwegians receiving free passage substantially exceeded the proportion of Norwegians among the total of all emigrants landed. In the worst year, 1865, while Norwegians constituted about 16 percent of the total landed, they constituted 42 percent to the total assisted. In his 1866 report, the Chief Emigration Agent complained of the "heavy expense" of "assisting the indigent poor of almost every Norwegian ship to reach the American frontier," and noted that he had prepared a special report for his government, and had brought the situation to the attention of the Swedish-Norwegian consul in Quebec.⁹⁸

The emigration authorities tried to reduce the expense of providing free passage for destitute Norwegians by holding their baggage for redemption at a later date, but this plan met with only limited success because these people had so little of value in their baggage that they often did not bother to redeem it.⁹⁹ The authorities also tried to entice them to remain in Canada by paying their passage to a destination in the province and promising employment, but the Norwegians could not be deflected from their intention of reaching the settlements of their countrymen in the United States.¹⁰⁰ Finally, in 1868 the policy of providing assistance to destitute "foreign"—i.e., non-British (chiefly Norwegians and Germans)—was discontinued.¹⁰¹ Unfortunately, this information did not reach Norway before the early summer departure of the emigrant ships. When these ships reached Quebec some of the captains provided passage money to destitute emigrants, while other masters simply landed them and left them to fend for themselves. Of these, some received passage money from friends and relatives, while others were helped by private charity. In one extreme case reported by the Chief Emigration Agent at Quebec, he advised the Swedish-Norwegian consul that the master of the vessel Caroline from Christiania intended to land 85 destitute emigrants and appealed for assistance. The consul replied that since there had been no breach of contract, he could "officially take no notice of them;" and furthermore, that he would advise the master of the Caroline "to land his passengers whenever he thinks proper, within the limit of the law, and if through over-crowding or otherwise, malignant fever should break out, the responsibility does certainly not fall on my shoulders."¹⁰²

After landing, those among the new arrivals with "through tickets" continued on their way by rail or ship, while others—if they had the means—made arrangements to do so with the eagerly competing rail and steamer lines. The route to the western states, which as noted earlier was the destination of all but a few of the Norwegians, lead about 1,200 miles by water to the port cities of Chicago and Milwaukee. By the late 1840's navigation improvements made it possible for small steamers to pass from Quebec to Montreal, then through the Welland Canal to these and other ports on the Great Lakes. The route was substantially cheaper than the routes out of New York by rail or the Erie Canal to Buffalo and by steamer down the Great Lakes, or by rail all of the way from New York to Buffalo.¹⁰³ The Canadian emigration authorities correctly anticipated in 1849 that when the "greater economy" of the "uninterrupted water communication between Quebec and the North-western states" became known in Europe a change in the direction of the emigration stream would "most naturally take place," as indeed it did, and that Canada would benefit.¹⁰⁴ What they did not anticipate then was that as rail and steamer transportation became organized into large systems in future years, it was a simple matter for agents in Europe, and certainly to their benefit, to book the emigrants on "through tickets" as far west as possible—that is to Milwaukee and Chicago or even Duluth—thus depriving Canada of settlers.¹⁰⁵ For the emigrants' convenience and to prevent them from being defrauded, the immigration authorities provided them with detailed information on routes, distances, and fares. In 1850, the emigrants were able to travel by steamer from Quebec to Montreal, from there to Buffalo by rail, and on to Chicago by steamer in eight to ten days. Emigrants were advised in 1853 of the opening of the Great Western Railroad from Hamilton (to which the emigrants would have gone by steamer from Quebec) to Detroit, where it connected with the Michigan Central Railroad for Chicago.¹⁰⁶ And in the next year's report, the Chief Emigration Agent waxed enthusiastic about this route.¹⁰⁷

Our unrivalled inland navigation from Quebec to Hamilton, 590 miles, thence by railroad to Chicago, a distance of 465 miles further, places the emigrant at once in the heart of the great Western states; and when it is considered that this journey can be performed in the space of about five days, and at a cost of somewhat less than [2 pounds] sterling, these facts, in addition to the well-known protection afforded, whereby emigrants are exempt from many of the evils to which they have been too notoriously exposed in the United States, cannot but most materially benefit and encourage the emigration from Europe by this route, and which at no distant day, must become the leading thoroughfare to the Great West. . . .

By 1860, the completed Grand Trunk Railroad from Quebec through to Sarnia and Detroit, where it connected with the Michigan Central, and the already well-established steamer lines, gave the emigrants a choice of two uninterrupted routes to the American midwest. Or rail and ship accommodations could be combined to suit the resources and destinations of the emigrants. The journey by rail took two days and by steamer about one week, but it was cheaper by steamer than by rail. The accommodations on both were simple, if not primitive.¹⁰⁸ The cheapest passage on a steamer was "deck fare," that is, the passengers simply lived and slept among the equipment and cargo on the deck, perhaps with some shelter from the weather.¹⁰⁹ Passengers on the emigrant trains complained of being treated like cattle. Thus, the journey inland, while relatively brief compared to the length of the ocean voyage, was likely to be uncomfortable and wearisome, and was not without its hazards of sickness and accident. In June of 1864, for example, a train made up of a second class car and four box cars into which were crowded 467 emigrants, including some Scandinavians, plunged into the Richelieu River through an open drawbridge with a loss of 88 lives.¹¹⁰ The most well-known of the steamer disasters in which Norwegians were involved occurred on Lake Erie in August of 1852 when the Atlantic was rammed by another vessel and sank. Of the 103 Norwegians aboard 68 were lost. Many other Norwegian emigrants who were to have been on the Atlantic were left at Buffalo because they did not have the money to pay their fare, perhaps thereby saving their lives.¹¹¹

Some of the emigrants remained in Chicago or Milwaukee or the other Great Lakes ports at which they had landed, but most continued by rail or wagon to the Norwegian settlements farther west. How far this final stage of their journey took them depended, of course, on their destination. Indeed, for many the established settlements served only as base camps from which they sooner or later would strike out again. During the 25 years covered by this study, the frontier line of Norwegian settlement advanced from central Wisconsin and Iowa, through Minnesota, to the Dakotas. For those who came at the end of the period, that is to say 1875, and sought that frontier, the journey was several hundred miles farther than it had been a quarter of a century before.

EPILOGUE: MORE THAN AN INTERLUDE

In his study of Norwegian emigration to Canada during the period 1850 to 1865, Blegen suggests that this was merely an "interlude," a temporary diversion of the Norwegian emigrant stream from the United States.¹¹² This was not the case however. While it is true that after 1865 a major part of the emigrant stream from Norway once again entered at ports in the United States, Norwegian emigration to Canada continued to ebb and flow after 1865 as it had since 1850.¹¹³ The same misgivings about the emigrants "continuing on to the western states," the same complaints about competition from American emigrant agents in Europe, the same concerns about the prospects for Scandinavian emigration, the same disappointment that the Scandinavians knew so little about Canada but so much about the United States, the same praise of the virtues of the Scandinavians, and the same

recommendations about how to attract Scandinavians to Canada also continued to appear in the immigration reports.¹¹⁴

In 1875, the Canadian government, discouraged by the meager results of its efforts to attract Scandinavians directly from their homelands, undertook to prevail upon those closer at hand to settle in Canada. A Norwegian-American from Chicago, one Anders Halvorsen, was engaged to promote the idea of Canadian settlement among Scandinavians in the American midwest. In the summer of 1875, Halvorsen and a Robert F. Rowan were designated Scandinavian delegates, and in that capacity went to Manitoba to inquire into employment opportunities for Scandinavians and to examine two recommended settlement sites, one north of Winnipeg on Lake Winnipeg and the other south of Winnipeg in the Pembina Mountain area. They were not impressed with the suitability of these proposed sites, however, and their report ended with a discouraging comment on the isolation of the sites and the great difficulties of travel within this region of Manitoba. Nothing seems to have come of these proposed Scandinavian settlement sites.¹¹⁵

Efforts in the 1880's to establish settlements of Scandinavians were somewhat more successful. In the summer of 1885, "New Scandinavia," the first Scandinavian colony in northwestern Canada, was established under the auspices of the Scandinavian Colonization Society of Manitoba on a reserve of 80,000 acres of land in the Riding Mountain district about 12 miles north of Minnedosa, Manitoba. As a result of heavy advertising which attracted settlers from Scandinavia and the United States, the new colony did well, and by 1886 had 68 settlers, "several of whom have comfortable houses built," and a saw mill and shingle mill. The settlers were reported to be "pretty equally divided" between Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes, with a few Scandinavian-Americans. A second important colony established in July of 1886 was "New Stockholm," sponsored by the Scandinavian Union of Winnipeg and the Canadian Pacific Railroad, and located north of Whitewood about 250 miles west of Winnipeg in what was to become the Province of Saskatchewan. The land at New Stockholm was reported to be "principally open prairie, and therefore better adapted for root and cereal productions" than the land at the New Scandinavian colony, which was more suited to stock raising. By 1888, the New Stockholm colony included 48 families, who had harvested a good crop, and had established school districts and a post office, and engaged a minister. By 1896, there were 512 "souls" at New Scandinavia and 280 at New Stockholm, while over 1,800 other "souls" (including some Finnish) were scattered among settlements in Manitoba, the Northwest Territories, and British Columbia.¹¹⁶

In his report for 1887, the immigration agent at Winnipeg commented that due to "the general crowding of settlers in the Western States and the fairly rapid increase of the Scandinavian element in this country, many people will find their way into the Canadian North-West."¹¹⁷ And indeed, by the late 1880's the "pull" and "push" factors necessary for movement across the border into Canada were emerging. The "pull" factor consisted of the presence of nuclear Scandinavian settlements and the availability of cheap, fertile land in Canada, conditions which the Canadian government endeavoured to bring to the attention of potential emigrants in the United States and Scandinavia through advertising and emigration agents. The "push" factor was made up of the exhaustion of the supply of cheap land, heavy farm debt, overcrowding, and poor economic conditions in the midwestern states. But the movement of Scandinavian-Americans into Canada as a result of the operation of these two factors was slow to develop, and it was not until the mid-1890's that their effects began to be significant. In his 1894 report, the Scandinavian immigration officer at Winnipeg observed that:¹¹⁸

Though the emigration from Scandinavian countries has decreased during the last season, the same class of immigration to Canada from the United States has wonderfully improved; and we may congratulate ourselves on the inauguration and continual increase

of this movement, as well as on the quality of the people we are getting from the States, the Norwegian especially being all first class farmers, moving into Canada in numbers and drawing their friends after them.

And in his reports for 1899 and 1900-01, he included some interesting data on the movement of Scandinavians from the United States (and directly from Scandinavia) into the Canadian northwest, as shown in Table 6.¹¹⁹ While the numbers are modest, they represent only the early contribution to what became in the years prior to World War I a veritable flood of Scandinavians into western Canada.¹²⁰

Table 6

Scandinavian Immigration Into
Northwestern Canada, 1899-1901

Nationality	1899	1900-01*
Swedish		
Sweden	180	436
U.S.	204	679
Norwegian		
Norway	43	249
U.S.	220	512
Danish		
Denmark	68	118
U.S.	49	104
*1/1/00-6/30/01		

NOTES

1. Theodore C. Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America, 1825-1860. Northfield: Norwegian-American Historical Association, 1931. Pp. 349-350.
2. The annual reports of the emigration agents are cited in the Notes as follows: (year) Report. (pages). See Sources of Emigration and Immigration Reports for full citation information.
3. It should be noted that St. John in New Brunswick, Halifax in Nova Scotia, and Montreal were also emigrant landing ports. Unfortunately, the reports from these ports do not provide the detailed information included in the Quebec report. Also, there appears to be some duplication in the statistics from the various ports, particularly between Montreal and Quebec. For these reasons, and also because all but a very few of the Norwegians landed at Quebec, only the reports prepared for Quebec were used as sources.
4. On Canadian migration statistics, see: Imre Ferenczi, International Migrations: Volume I: Statistics. New York: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1970. "Canada," Pp. 357-370.
5. Marcus Lee Hansen. The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945. Pp. 253-255.
6. Christopher O. Closter, a Norwegian who served as Norwegian assistant to the Chief Emigration Agent at Quebec from 1858 to 1862, commented on the reasons for the shift of the Norwegian vessels to Quebec as follows: "The causes of adopting this Port [Quebec], as a more favourable [one] than New York, are owing to the readiness of obtaining cargo [emigrants], on return home, as well as the facility offered by the St. Lawrence, to forward passengers westward." Closter apparently was influential in bringing this change about in 1850, as suggested by his comment: "The experience gained, by my describing the facilities of the Port, etc., to the Norwegian Shipowners, in the winter of 1850, in landing their passengers at Quebec, proved satisfactory the first year, and have since been adopted by mostly all." 1858 Report. P. 29. Closter was in the business of promoting Norwegian lumber shipping at the time. On Closter see: Theodore C. Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America: The American Transition. Northfield: Norwegian-American Historical Association, 1940. Pp. 360-376.
7. Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America. 1931. P. 351; Jacob S. Worm-Muller. "Emigrant og Kanadafarten." In: Den Norske Sjøfarts Historie, Fra de Aeldste Tider Til Vore Dage. Vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 566-568. Oslo: Steenske-Forlag, 1951. For a detailed discussion of the participation of Norwegian ships in the Canadian timber trade, see: Helge W. Nordvik. "Norwegian Emigrants and Canadian Timber: Norwegian Shipping to Quebec, 1850-1875." A paper presented at the meeting of the International Commission for Maritime History, during the Comité International des Sciences Historiques Conference, University of Stuttgart, Federal Republic of Germany, August 25-September 1, 1985; Francis Sejersted. "Aspects of the Norwegian Timber Trade in the 1840s and '50s." Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 16, no. 2, 1986. Pp. 137-154. Worm-Muller observes that the emigrant trade was an important factor in the development of the Norwegian maritime industry—as indeed it was in that of other European nations. See: Hansen. The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860. Chap. 8. On the development of the Canadian timber industry and trade, see: Donald Creighton. The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937. Pp. 148-150, passim; A. R. M. Lower. "The Trade in Square Timber." In: Contributions to Canadian Economics. University of Toronto Studies. History and Economics.

Vol. 5, Pp. 40-61. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1932; Gerald S. Graham. "Napoleon's Baltic Blockade and the Birth of the Canadian Timber Trade." Baltic and Scandinavian Countries. Vol. 5, January, 1939. Pp. 28-30.

8. Information on the Lyna and Benedicte is included in 1850 Report, Pp. 14, 25, 43. A ship also arrived from Tonsberg with 15 passengers, and another from Sandefjord with two, but the Lyna and Benedicte were reported as the first to arrive. A former interpreter for Norwegian and Swedish emigrants at the Norwegian-Swedish consulate at Quebec stated in 1860 that "a few" Norwegians arrived in Quebec as early as 1847, but there does not appear to be any record of them. See: Report of the Select Committee. 1860. P. 53. The Lyna was a full-rigged wooden ship about 121 feet long and 30 feet wide, of 300 tons burden. The Benedicte was the same type and probably about the same size. (Information courtesy of the Norsk Sjøfartsmuseum, Oslo, Norway, letter dated February 4, 1982).
9. Information on steamboat and railroad routes and fares is contained in the 1850 Report. Pp. 6-8.
10. 1850 Report. Pp. 14, 66-67. The total tax on the Lyna's passengers was 22 pounds, 1 shilling, and 3 pence.
11. Drammens Adresse, June 8, June 27, and July 18, 1850.
12. Drammens Tidende, July 7, 1850. Since 227 passengers arrived in Quebec and the Lyna carried 157 passengers when it departed Drammen, and there were no deaths and three births during the voyage, the Benedicte must have carried 67 emigrants when it left Drammen. (Copies of the articles in Adresse and Tidende courtesy of the Buskerud Fylkesbibliotek, Drammen, Norway, February, 1982.)
13. The "agent" referred to by Adresse may have been Christopher O. Closter—see note 6.
- 13A. As noted earlier, in 1850, 227 emigrants departed from Drammen, 15 from Tonsberg, and 2 from Sandefjord. No port of departure information was recorded in 1851.
14. During the period 1851 to 1871, 598,018 persons arrived in Canada via the St. Lawrence, and 426,826 from the United States. Of this total of 1,024,844 emigrants, 588,326 or about 57 percent continued on to the United States. Further Correspondence Respecting Emigration. 1872. P. 11.
15. This summary discussion of emigration to Canada is drawn from the emigration reports and from the following sources: Helen I. Cowan. British Emigration to British North America: The First Hundred Years. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961; Stanley C. Johnson. A History of Emigration From the United Kingdom to North America, 1763-1912. New York: A. M. Kelley, 1966 (first published in 1913); Norman Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1966.
16. Ferenczi. International Migrations. Volume I: Statistics. Table I, P. 360. The statistics begin in 1816, but only total figures are provided for 1816 to 1828. Beginning in 1829, emigrants are classified by "country of origin" for England, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, and Norway, and "other countries."

17. Gilbert Tucker. "The Famine Immigration to Canada, 1847." American Historical Review. Vol. 36, April, 1931. Pp. 533-549.
18. Similar laws were adopted by the United States and eventually by Norway. These laws are discussed more fully in a later section.
19. These were called "emigration" offices because they were established to verify adherence during the voyage to British law for the protection of those emigrating from ports in the United Kingdom. On the development of the Canadian administrative system for immigration, see: J. E. Hodgetts. Pioneer Public Service: An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841-1867. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955. Chap. 15; MacDonagh. A Pattern of Government Growth, 1800-60; The Passenger Acts and Their Enforcement. London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1961.
20. See: Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Chap. 3; Paul W. Gates. "Official Encouragement to Immigration by the Province of Canada." Canadian Historical Review. Vol. 15, March, 1934. Pp. 24-38.
21. Report of the Select Committee. 1860. Pp. 7, 45, 47-48; 1860 Report. Pp. 9-10. Valuable but limited information about Canada for prospective emigrants was provided in the narrative of the travels there in 1863 of Johan Schröder, a Norwegian gentleman farmer, published in Christiania (Oslo) in 1867. See: Orm Øverland (ed). Johan Schröder's Travels in Canada, 1863. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989.
22. Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Pp. 76-77, 118-120. On the activities of these agents, see: Merle Curti and Kendall Birr. "The Immigrant and the American Image in Europe, 1860-1914." Mississippi Valley Historical Review. Vol. 37, September, 1950. Pp. 203-230.
23. Johnson. A History of Emigration From the United Kingdom to North America, 1763-1912. Pp. 176-183.
24. Johnson. A History of Emigration From the United Kingdom to North America, 1763-1912. P. 179 and Chap.9; Report of Select Committee. 1860. Pp. 9-11; 1866 Report. Pp. 12-14.
25. See: Report of the Select Committee. 1860. Pp. 42, 44, 48-52; 1858 Report. P. 10; 1868 Report. P. 4; 1873 Report. P. iv.
26. 1868 Report. P. 4.
27. On competition from other nations and the British colonies, see: Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Pp. 116-118.

28. For example, see: 1853 Report. P. 22; 1856 Report. P. 22; 1858 Report. P. 9; 1859 Report. Pp. 8-9; 1862 Report. P. 15. It is not possible to conclude from the sources consulted for this study whether the preference for Norwegians (and for other Scandinavian and German) emigrants was based on racist sentiments on the part of the emigration officials or on objective evidence available to them that people from these nations were more likely to succeed as settlers. See: Mauri A. Jalava. "The Scandinavians as a Source of Settlers for the Dominion of Canada: The First Generation, 1867-1897." Scandinavian-Canadian Studies. Association for the Advancement of Scandinavian Studies in Canada, 1983. Pp. 3-14.
29. For example, see: 1852 Report. P. 12; 1853 Report. P. 39; 1854 Report. P. 24; 1855 Report. P. 12; 1856 Report. P. 22; 1857 Report. P. 23; 1860 Report. P. 4; 1861 Report. P. 11. The determination of the Norwegians to reach the American Midwest was unswerving. Even those who remained in Canada to take immediate employment because of a lack of money left for that destination as soon as they had earned enough for the fare.
30. 1858 Report. P. 28.
31. On concern over alleged prejudice against Canada, see, for example: 1859 Report. P. 8; 1861 Report. P. 11.
32. 1853 Report. P. 22.
33. Report of the Select Committee. 1860. P. 9.
34. 1854 Report. P. 13.
35. 1858 Report. P. 31.
36. 1858 Report. P. 32.
37. 1860 Report. P. 19; for other details on the Eastern Township settlement, see: Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America. 1940. Pp. 359-367.
38. 1856 Report. P. 22.
39. Morgenbladet (Christiania). November 2, 1856.
40. 1863 Report. P. 6; also see: 1861 Report. Pp. 5-6, 9, 11; 1862 Report. Pp. 22, 28-29.
41. 1859 Report. Pp. 8-9, 25.
42. 1861 Report. P. 11.
43. For Closter's comment on the situation when his party arrived in Gaspé, see: 1860 Report. Pp. 18-19.
44. 1862 Report. Pp. 8-9.
45. 1862 Report. P. 20.

46. 1862 Report. P. 22.
47. 1873 Report. P. 61. For other details on the Gaspé settlement, see: Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America. 1940. Pp. 367-381; Hjalmar Rued Holand, "Gaspé: Et Trist Blad i Vor Nybyggersaga." Symra. Vol. 5, 1909. Pp. 2-8; N. C. Brun. "Forste Aars Oplevelser." Symra. Vol. 7, 1911. Pp. 110-119. Orm Øverland. "The Norwegian Settlement in Gaspé 1860-1862: The Failure of the Canadian Bureau of Agriculture, of the Settlers or the Land?" Norse Heritage Stavanger: Norwegian Emigration Center, 1991. Vol. 2, Pp. 73-82; also see Øverland's book on Johan Schroøder, cited in note 21.
48. Report of the Select Committee. 1860. P. 54.
49. 1858 Report. P. 29.
50. 1859 Report. P. 25.
51. 1858 Report. P. 32.
52. Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America. 1940. Pp. 371-373.
53. 1860 Report. Pp. 2-3.
54. 1864 Report. P. 105.
55. 1864 Report. P. 104. The problem of destitute Norwegian emigrants is discussed in a later section.
56. 1866 Report. P. 7.
57. This pamphlet was based on Jorgensen's contacts with Norwegian emigrants at Quebec, on Norwegian government statistics and reports, and on an early study of emigration: Jules Duval. Histoire de L'Emigration Europeene, Asiatique et Africaine aux XIX Siecle: Ses Causes, Ses Caracteres, Ses Effets. Paris: Librairie de Guillaumin et Cie, 1862. While Jorgensen's pamphlet includes comments on emigration from several European countries, it is mostly concerned with Norway.
58. Jorgensen. The Emigration From Europe During the Present Century. P. 13.
59. 1862 Report. P. 6.
60. Lars Ljungmark. "Canada's Campaign for Scandinavian Immigration, 1873-1876", Swedish-American Historical Quarterly. Vol. 33, January, 1982. P. 22-23.
61. 1872 Report. P. 165.
62. 1872 Report. P. 165.
63. Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Pp. 44-45; Ljungmark, "Canada's Campaign for Scandinavian Immigration, 1873-1876." Pp. 26-28.

64. Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Pp. 45-47.
65. 1873 Report. P. 62. On McDougal's activities, see his report in: 1873 Report. Pp. 60-65; and Ljungmark. "Canada's Campaign for Scandinavian Immigration, 1873-1876." Pp. 24-32.
66. Ljungmark. "Canada's Campaign for Scandinavian Immigration, 1873-1876." Pp. 29-30.
67. 1873 Report. P. 64.
68. 1874 Report. P. 136. On Mattson's activities, see his report in: 1874 Report. Pp. 134-137; and Ljungmark. "Canada's Campaign for Scandinavian Immigration, 1873-1876." Also see: Hans Mattson. Reminiscences; The Story of an Emigrant. St. Paul: D. D. Merrill Co., 1891.
69. Mattson was also involved in the work of establishing an Icelandic settlement in Canada—see: Ljungmark. "Canada's Campaign for Scandinavian Immigration, 1873-1876." Pp. 35-38. On the Icelandic settlements, see: Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Pp. 207-213; Helgi Skuli Kjartansson. "The Onset of Emigration From Iceland." American Studies in Scandinavia. Vol. 9, 1977. Pp. 87-93; and the annual immigration reports from 1873 onward.
70. Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America. 1940. Pp. 381-382; Gates. "Official Encouragement to Immigration by the Province of Canada." Pp. 37-38; Ljungmark. "Canada's Campaign for Scandinavian Immigration, 1873-1876." Pp. 40-41; Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Pp. 205-206.
- 70a. For descriptions of the sea journey of Norwegian emigrants, see: Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America. 1940. Pp. 3-36; Semmingsen. Veien Mot Vest. 1942. Pp. 97-151; Semmingsen. Veien Mot Vest. 1950. Pp. 140-180; H. Cock-Jensen. "An Emigrant Voyage in the Fifties." NAHA Studies. Vol. 1, 1926. Pp. 126-133; Karl E. Erickson. "The Emigrant Journey in the Fifties." NAHA Studies. Vol. 8, 1934. Pp. 65-91; Clara Jacobson. "A Journey to America in the Fifties." NAHA Studies. Vol. 12, 1941. Pp. 60-78; Henrietta Larson. "An Immigration Journey to America in 1854." NAHA Studies. Vol. 3, 1928. Pp. 58-64; Einar J. Anderson. "The Voyage of the Immigrant and How It Has Changed." Swedish-American Bulletin. Vol. 2, August 1929. Pp. 70-103; also see selected letters in: Theodore C. Blegen. Land of Their Choice; The Immigrants Write Home. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. Scandinavian-American works of fiction also often include faithful descriptions of the journey across the North Sea to Hull, the train trip to Liverpool, and the voyage across the north Atlantic. See: Dorothy Burton Skardal. The Divided Heart: Scandinavian Immigrant Experience Through Literary Sources. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1974. Pp. 62-80. Also see note 71.
71. There is a vast body of literature on the subject of emigrant transport—see the following and the material cited therein: Terry Coleman. Passage to America: A History of Emigrants from Great Britain and Ireland to America in the Mid-nineteenth Century. London: Penquin Books, 1976. Chaps. 6-7; Edwin C. Guillet. The Great Migration: The Atlantic Crossing by Sailing Ship Since 1770. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1937. Chaps. 8-13; Philip Taylor. The Distant Magnet: European Emigration to the U.S.A. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Chaps. 7-8.

72. Friedrich Kapp. Immigration and the Commissioners of Emigration. New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969 (first published in 1870). P. 43.
73. Charles K. Harley. "The Shift From Sailing Ships to Steamships, 1850-1890: A Study in Technological Change and Its Diffusion." In: Donald N. McClosky Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain After 1840. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. P. 230, n. 11; Kapp. Immigration and the Commissioners of Emigration. Pp. 19-20.
74. "Tons burden" refers to the weight or volume of cargo which a ship could carry, not to its actual weight, which would be "tons displacement." An 1815 English maritime dictionary defines a ton as 2,000 pounds by weight or 40 cubic feet by volume, and it is reasonable to assume that this definition applied in Canada. The standard Norwegian measurement was the "kommerselest" or "commercial last," which was about 4,000 pounds, or about two times an English ton.
75. Worm-Muller. "Emigrant og Kanadafarten." P. 584; Norsk Sjøfartsmuseum, Oslo, Norway, letter dated October 17, 1986.
76. Because of the inefficiency, low power, and unreliability of the early marine steam engines, it was not possible to depend entirely on them for long ocean voyages. Thus, the early steamers, while they may have had iron hulls, were really sailing ships with auxiliary steam engines. It was not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the passenger steamship as it is known today was developed, and even then right to the end of the century, such vessels carried masts and other vestiges of their sailing ship origins. See: Arthur J. Maginnis. The Atlantic Ferry: Its Ships, Men, and Working. London: Whittaker and Co., 1900. On the change from sail to steam in the emigrant trade, see the material cited in note 71, and also: Harley. "The Shift From Sailing Ships to Steamships, 1850-1890: A Study in Technological Change and Its Diffusion."
77. See: Per Fuglum. "Norge i Stopeskjeen, 1884-1920." In: Knut Myklund(ed). Norges Historie. Oslo: J. W. Cappelens Forlag, 1978. Vol. 12, pp. 234-252; Ole Gjolberg. "The Substitution of Steam for Sail in Norwegian Ocean Shipping, 1866-1914: A Study in the Economics of Diffusion." Scandinavian Economic History Review. Vol. 28. no. 2, 1980. Pp. 135-146; Johan Nicolay Tonnesen. "Jern og Stalseilskuter: Siste Treseilskutetid." In: Worm-Muller. Den Norske Sjøfarts Historie; Fra De Aeldste Tider til Vore Dage. Vol. 2, pp. 1-97. According to the annual emigration reports, only one steamer—and a non-Norwegian one at that—arrived with emigrants directly from Norway during the entire 24 year period of this study. In 1872, the Woodham, a small English steamer about 209 feet long and 980 tons burden—not much larger than the sailing ships coming to Quebec—called at Quebec with 88 Norwegian emigrants and a cargo of iron after a voyage of 19 days from Christiania. See: 1872 Report. P. 84. For later developments in the transition from sail to steam, see: Lauritz Pettersen. "From Sail to Steam in Norwegian Emigration. 1870-1910." In: Klaus Friedland (ed). Maritime Aspects of Migration. Koln: Bohlau, 1989. Pp. 125-131.
78. There were parallel differences in the death rates among emigrants on board sailing vessels and steamers arriving in New York. For example, for five of the six years from 1864 through 1869, the percentage of those on board steamers who died ranged from .09 to .13; in only one exceptional year did the percentage rise to .52. But during the same period, 1864-1869, the percentage for sailing vessels ranged from .49 to 1.23. Kapp. Immigration and the Commissioners of Emigration. P. 241.

79. For the comments of the Chief Emigration Agent on the reasons for the high death rates among the Scandinavian (and German) emigrants arriving at Quebec, see: 1861 Report. Pp. 4-5; 1862 Report. Pp. 4-5, 13.
80. The laws dealing with emigrants and emigration fall into two broad categories. Emigration regulatory laws are intended to regulate the volume and composition of the emigration stream by imposing qualitative and quantitative restrictions. Emigrant protection laws are designed to protect emigrants at the ports of embarkation and debarkation, and during the intervening voyage. The passenger acts were the most important of these emigration protection laws.
81. The development of the British passenger acts is covered in: MacDonagh. A Pattern of Government Growth, 1800-1860: The Passenger Acts and Their Enforcement. Convenient summaries will be found in: Johnson. A History of Emigration From the United Kingdom to North America, 1763-1912. Chap. 5; Guillet. The Great Migration: The Atlantic Crossing by Sailing Ship Since 1770. Chap. 2; Coleman. Passage to America: A History of Emigrants From Great Britain and Ireland to America in the Mid-nineteenth Century. Chap. 13 and Appendix A (a summary of British and American passenger acts); Taylor. The Distant Magnet: European Emigration to the U.S.A. Chap. 6.
82. There is no comprehensive history of the U.S. passenger laws, but see the sources cited in note 81, and the following: Hansen. The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860; Kapp. Immigration and the Commissioners of Emigration; William J. Bromwell. History of Immigration to the United States. New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969 (first published in 1856; includes the texts of passenger acts from 1819 to 1855); George M. Stephenson. A History of American Immigration, 1820-1924. New York: Russell and Russell, 1964. Chap. 19.
83. It was the passenger density formula of the 1819 law which the Restauration, carrying the first organized group of 53 emigrants to the United States, ran afoul when it arrived in New York in October of 1825, for with its (estimated) 37 tons burden it should have carried only 15 passengers. As provided by the law, the ship was confiscated, but it was later returned. See Blegen's discussion of the incident in: Norwegian Migration to America. 1940. Pp. 599-628. Coleman notes that while many vessels were seized under the forfeiture clause of the 1819 passenger act, the practice apparently was to return the seized vessel after the payment of a fine—see: Coleman. Passage to America: A History of Emigrants from Great Britain and Ireland to America in then Mid-nineteenth Century. P. 353.
84. Hansen. The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860. Pp. 253-255.
85. This discussion of Norwegian emigrant protection laws is based on the following sources: Blegen. Norwegian Migration to America. 1931. Chap. 10; Gunnar Malmin. "Norsk Landman i U.S.; Official Documents." Decorah Posten. Vol. 51, December 26, 1924 and January 2, 1925; Den Norske Utvandringslovgivnings Historie. Kongeriket Norges Syttiend Ordentlige. Stortings Forhandlinger, 1921. Third part, Pp. 8-20; Ingrid Semmingsen. Veien Mot Vest; Utvandringen Fra Norge Til Amerika, 1825-1865. Oslo: Aschehoug, 1942. Pp. 152-178. I am grateful to the late Helen Fletre for her generosity in translating the older articles and documents used in this study.
86. Semmingsen. Veien Mot Vest. 1942. P. 168.
87. 1861 Report. Pp. 4-5; 1862 Report. P. 3; the figure for passengers departed includes births during the voyage.

88. Den Norske Utvandringslovgivnings Historie. P. 16.
89. Semmingsen. Veien Mot Vest. 1942. P. 178.
90. The activities and regulation of steamship company agents in Denmark, where the situation was essentially the same as in Norway, is discussed in: Kristian Hvidt. "Emigration Agents; The Development of a Business and Its Methods." Scandinavian Journal of History. Vol. 3, 1978. Pp. 179-203.
91. A diligent search and correspondence with scholars, archivists, and museum directors in England has confirmed that there is very little material on the trans-shipment of emigrants through England. The archives of the Wilson Line, which held a virtual monopoly of the North Sea passenger business in the early years, were largely destroyed in the bombings during World War II. But see: Ingrid Semmingsen. Veien Mot Vest: Utvandringen Fra Norge, 1865-1915. Oslo: Aschehough, 1950. Pp. 158-165; Johan Larsson. "The Diary and Notes of Johan Larsson." The Bridge. Vol. 14, no. 3, 1982. Pp. 90-94; Vol. 15, no. 1, 1983. Pp. 4-11; Karl Wilhelm Olsson. "When the Building Contractor's Boy in Hasangen Journeyed to America in 1881." The Bridge. Vol. 19, no. 1, 1987. Pp. 15-23, 31; Paul Knaplund. Moorings Old and New; Entries in an Immigrant's Log. Madison: Wisconsin State Historical Society, 1963. Pp. 133-148; Ulf Beijbom. "The Swedish Emigrants' Liverpool." Swedish-American Historical Quarterly. Vol. 38, July, 1987. Pp. 97-116; Reports received relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull, 1881.
92. The vessels in the North Sea passenger trade did not fall under either the Norwegian or British passenger acts, but were regulated by the respective merchant shipping laws of the two countries. The ships which the emigrants boarded in England for the trans-Atlantic voyage did come under the British act, however.
93. Knaplund. Moorings Old and New; Entries in an Immigrant's Log. P. 136.
94. Olsson. "When the Building Contractor's Boy in Hasangen Journeyed to America in 1881." P. 19.
95. On the quarantine station on Grosse Isle and other aspects of the emigrants' arrival, see: Johnson. A History of Emigration From the United Kingdom to North America, 1763-1912. Chap. 7; Guillet. The Great Migration; The Atlantic Crossing by Sailing-Ship Since 1770. Chap. 15.
96. 1849 Report. Pp. 10-11; 1850 Report. Pp. 21-22; 1851 Report. Pp. 19-21. Tucker. "The Famine Immigration to Canada, 1847." Also see works on Canadian immigration cited in note 15.
97. 1864 Report. Pp. 104-105; 1865 Report. P. 65; 1866 Report. P. 7.
98. 1866 Report. P. 7.
99. 1864 Report. P. 104; 1866 Report. P. 7.
100. 1856 Report. P. 24.
101. 1868 Report. Pp. 8-9.

102. 1868 Report. Pp. 13-14.
103. 1849 Report. P. 24.
104. 1849 Report. P. 12.
105. Report of the Select Committee. 1860. Pp. 42, 49-52.
106. 1853 Report. Pp. 25, 35.
107. 1854 Report. P. 13.
108. The sources cited in note 70a include some descriptions of the journey west from Quebec.
109. Report of the Select Committee. 1860. P. 52.
110. 1864 Report. Pp. 9, 105.
111. 1852 Report. Pp. 21-22; Henrietta Larson. "The Sinking of the 'Atlantic' on Lake Erie." NAHA Studies. Vol. 4, 1929. Pp. 92-98. This account (a letter) was also published in: Blegen. Land of Their Choice; The Immigrants Write Home. Pp. 169-172. Also see the account of the burning of the steamer Montreal in June of 1857-1857 Report. P. 24.
112. Blegen. "Canadian Interlude." Norwegian Migration to America. 1940. Pp. 357-382.
113. This brief concluding discussion must be couched in terms of Scandinavians due to the use of this category for all emigrants from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark who trans-shipped through England, as noted earlier. It is a reasonable assumption that a substantial proportion of these emigrants were Norwegians, however.
114. For example, see: 1876 Report. P. 124; 1881 Report. Pp. 60, 195; 1886 Report. Pp. 242-243; 1887 Report. P. 91; 1888 Report. Pp. 48, 104-105; 1896 Report. Pp. 62-68; 1897 Report. Pp. 184-185, 186; 1898 Report P. 229; 1899 Report. Pp. 129-130.
115. 1875 Report. Pp. 165-166; Ljungmark. "Canada's Campaign for Scandinavian Immigration, 1873-1876." P. 40.
116. For information on the "New Scandinavia" and "New Stockholm" settlements, see: 1885 Report. P. 68; 1886 Report. Pp. 76-77, 143; 1887 Report. Pp. 91-92; 1888 Report. Pp. 110-111; 1890 Report. Pp. 110-111; 1896 Report. P. 130; Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Pp. 206-207; Kenneth O. Bjork. "Scandinavian Migration to the Prairie Provinces, 1893-1914." NAHA Studies. Vol. 26, 1874. P. 7.
117. 1887 Report. P. 91.
118. 1894 Report. P. 148.
119. 1899 Report. P. 131; 1900 Report. P. 130; 1900-01 Report. P. 118.

120. It should be noted that data on the movement of Americans into Canada in the early years is not accurate because many of them crossed the border on roads on which there are no check points, or where there were no roads at all. On the movement of Scandinavians into Canada, see: Bjork. "Scandinavian Migration to the Canadian Prairie Provinces, 1893-1914"; Gulbrand Loken. From Fjord to Frontier; A History of the Norwegians in Canada. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1980; on the settlement of the Canadian west, see: Macdonald. Canada: Immigration and Colonization, 1841-1903. Pp. 235-287.

SOURCES OF EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION REPORTS

From 1850 to 1860, the annual report of the Chief Emigration (or Emigrant) Agent at Quebec, into which were incorporated the reports of the emigration agents at other locations, was separately published, and from 1861 to 1866 it was included in the annual report of the Minister of Agriculture. No report was published in 1867. In 1868, Buchanan died, and this was the last year in which the agent at Quebec served as the "chief" to whom other agents sent their reports. Beginning in 1869, the annual reports of all immigration agents appear separately in the annual report of the Minister of Agriculture, and beginning in 1892, in the annual report of the Department of the Interior. Reports will be found in:

Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Accounts and Papers.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Report Session</u>	<u>Volume</u>
1850	1851	40
1851	1852	32
1852	1852-53	68
1853	1854	46
1854	1854-55	39
1861	1862	36

Reports received by the Board of Trade and the Local Government Board relating to the Transit of Scandinavian Emigrants through the Port of Hull, and to the arrangements for Feeding and Lodging them while there. Accounts and Papers. Session 1882, Volume 62.

Further Correspondence Respecting Emigration. Accounts and Papers. Session 1872. Volume 43.

Canada. Parliament. Sessional Papers.

<u>Report Year</u>	<u>Session</u>	<u>Volume</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Sessional Paper</u>
1855	1856	14	5	44
1856	1857	15	8	47
1857	1858	16	7	41
1858	1859	17	3	19
1859	1860	18	3	18
1860	1861	19	3	14
1861	see Accounts and Papers			
1862	1863	21	3	4
1863	1864	23	3	32
1864	1865	24	2	6
1865	1866	26	2	5
1866	1867	1	3	3
1867	no report published			
1868	1869	2	6	76
1869	1870	3	6	80

Report Year	Session	Volume	Number	Sessional Paper
1870	1871	4	6	64
1871	1872	5	2	2A
1872	1873	6	6	26
1873	1874	7	6	9
1874	1875	8	8	40
1875	1876	9	7	8
1876	1877	10	6	8
1877	1878	11	8	9
1878	1879	12	7	9
1879	1880	13	7	10
1880	1881	14	7	12
1881	1882	15	7	11
1882	1883	16	10	14
1883	1884	17	8	14
1884	1885	18	5	8
1885	1886	19	7	10
1886	1887	20	10	12
1887	1888	21	4	4
1888	1889	22	5	5
1889	1890	23	5	6
1890	1891	24	4	6
1891	1892	25	5	7
1892	1893	26	8	13
1893	1894	27	10	13
1894	1895	28	9	13
1895	1896	29	10	13
1896	1897	31	10	13
1897	1898	32	10	13
1898	1899	33	11	13
1899	1900	34	1	13
1900	1901	35	10	25 (Jan-June 1900)
1900-01	1902	36	10	25 (July 1900-June 1901)

Report of the Select Committee to Whom was referred the Annual Report of the Chief Emigration Agent [for 1859]. Journal of the Legislative Assembly. Session 1860. Volume 18, Appendix 4.